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I. Introduction 
Marriage equality has come to America. Throughout 2014, 
several federal appellate courts and numerous district court judges 
across the United States invalidated state constitutional or 
statutory proscriptions on same-sex marriage. Therefore, it was 
not surprising that Eastern District of Virginia Judge Arenda 
Wright Allen held that Virginia’s bans were unconstitutional in 
February. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit affirmed her opinion that July. North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and West Virginia District Judges rejected these 
jurisdictions’ prohibitions during autumn, and the Supreme Court 
approved marriage equality the next year. Because marriage 
equality in the Fourth Circuit presents significant legal questions 
which profoundly affect numbers of individuals, the road to 
equality in the Circuit’s states deserves analysis, which this piece 
conducts. 
Part I traces marriage equality’s national rise and growth. It 
finds that litigants pursued marriage equality in every state, 
including those of the Fourth Circuit, which lacked equality, and 
provoked some controversy. Part II assesses disposition of the 
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and West Virginia 
litigation; the Fourth Circuit opinion, which promptly affirmed the 
Virginia ruling and mandated the other jurists’ decisions; and 
Supreme Court resolution. It ascertains that North Carolina, 
South Carolina, and West Virginia District Judges correctly 
applied this binding Fourth Circuit precedent. Part III extracts 
lessons from the tale recounted, determining that marriage 
equality over the Fourth Circuit has generally clarified, although 
numerous pertinent questions remain unclear in certain areas of 
the Fourth Circuit and the country. Part IV, thus, proffers future 
suggestions for ensuring that the Fourth Circuit jurisdictions 
attain comprehensive marriage equality. 
II. A Brief History of Marriage Equality 
Marriage equality’s history, which preceded federal challenges 
to state laws, merits brief analysis here. The Justices’ 2013 opinion 
MARRIAGE EQUALITY 2007 
in United States v. Windsor1 prompted the new marriage equality 
suits and was important to numerous circuit and district court 
opinions which rejected bans.2 The plaintiffs filed cases in each 
jurisdiction that barred same-sex marriage.3  
Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the Windsor majority, 
held that section three in the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)4 
contravened the Fourteenth Amendment.5 The Court did not 
enunciate the proper level of review, but it seemed to use elevated, 
albeit less than strict, scrutiny.6 Kennedy detected little reason for 
DOMA’s incursions on dignity and personhood as well as the 
problematic damage that the statute inflicted upon same-sex 
couples and their children, while he did not address state bans.7 
                                                                                                     
 1. 570 U.S. 744 (2013); see Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: 
The New Jurisprudence of Gay Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817, 870–74 (2014) 
(discussing shifting constitutional views and the likelihood of further invalidation 
of laws restricting same-sex marriage). 
 2. See, e.g., Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 367 (4th Cir. 2014) (affirming 
an Eastern District of Virginia ruling that enjoined enforcement of laws banning 
same-sex marriage that were deemed to be unconstitutional); Baskin v. Bogan, 
766 F.3d 648, 672 (7th Cir. 2014) (affirming rulings from Indiana and Wisconsin 
district courts that invalidated laws prohibiting same-sex marriages in those 
states); see also DeLeon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 639–40 (W.D. Tex. 2014) 
(deciding that Texas’s refusal to recognize same-sex marriages from other 
jurisdictions was unconstitutional). 
 3. See Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014) (representing one of 
the many cases that the ACLU pursued, this one was pursued in the Fourth 
Circuit); Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1216 (D. Utah 2014) (showing 
that ACLU also participated in cases at the district court level, but local parties 
also filed a number of cases).  
 4. Defense of Marriage (DOMA) Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7, invalidated by United 
States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
 5. See Windsor, 570 U.S. at 775 (finding a section of DOMA to be an 
unconstitutional denial of equal marriage rights); Michael Klarman, Windsor and 
Brown, 127 HARV. L. REV. 127, 140 (2013) (comparing the doctrinally questionable 
opinion in Brown v. Board of Education to the Fourteenth Amendment 
justification used in Windsor).  
 6. See Windsor, 570 U.S. at 769–75 (discussing the manner in which the 
Court examined the statute before deciding “no legitimate purpose overcomes the 
purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its 
marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity”); Franklin, supra 
note 1, at 872 (explaining that the standard of review applied by courts includes 
heightened scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, rational basis, and “rational basis 
with bite”). 
 7. See Windsor, 570 U.S. at 771–73 (strongly praising federalism’s value); 
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This made Windsor’s impact on the bars ambiguous, yet equality 
proponents capitalized upon the ruling when disputing them and 
lower courts invoked Windsor to eliminate bans.8 Chief Justice 
John Roberts in a dissent explicitly remarked that the Court did 
not review state laws’ validity.9 
Thirty district court jurists rejected bans.10 The U.S. Courts of 
Appeals for the Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits 
affirmed district invalidations, even as the Sixth Circuit reversed 
determinations overturning four states’ laws in a case which the 
Justices resolved during June 2015.11 Litigants pursued appeals in 
                                                                                                     
infra notes 47–50 (discussing the evolving doctrinal treatment related to 
same-sex marriage and the effect on Virginia law).  
 8. See, e.g., Bishop v. U.S. ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1277–80 
(N.D. Okla. 2014) (concluding that Windsor should be applied to same-sex 
marriage at the state level); Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1193–94 
(D. Utah 2014) (following the reasoning in Windsor, the plaintiffs argued that 
Utah law violated their rights to equal protection and due process). 
 9. See Windsor, 570 U.S. at 776 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The Court does 
not have before it, and the logic of its opinion does not decide, the distinct question 
whether the States, in the exercise of their ‘historic and essential authority to 
define the marital relation,’ may continue to utilize the traditional definition of 
marriage.”); Klarman, supra note 5, at 158 (agreeing, Justice Scalia said that 
ideas employed to invalidate DOMA could analogously govern state bans); 
Franklin, supra note 1, at 870 (predicting that the Windsor decision’s approach 
to same-sex marriage would have ramifications for state laws). 
 10. See infra note 29 (citing cases in which bans were partially invalidated);  
Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 2 F. Supp. 3d 910, 927–28 (E.D. La. 2014) (finding that 
Louisiana’s definition of marriage does not infringe upon due process and equal 
protection rights), rev’d, 791 F.3d 616 (5th Cir. 2015); Conde-Vidal v. 
Garcia-Padilla, 54 F. Supp. 3d 157, 167–168 (D.P.R. 2014), vacated, sub nom. 
Conde-Vidal v. Rius-Armendariz, No. 14-2184, 2015 WL 10574261 (1st Cir. July 
8, 2015) (upholding the same-sex marriage ban in Puerto Rico); ALLIANCE FOR 
JUSTICE, LOVE AND THE LAW: FEDERAL CASES CHALLENGING STATE BANS ON 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2015), https://www.afj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/Federal-Marriage-Equality-Report-6.23.15-
POSITIVE.pdf [hereinafter AFJ]. 
 11. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015) (finding laws 
preventing same-sex marriage in Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee 
invalid and overturning the Sixth Circuit); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 367 
(4th Cir. 2014) (affirming an injunction granted in the Eastern District of Virginia 
to prevent enforcement of Virginia marriage laws that were found to violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment); DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 413, 421 (6th Cir. 
2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 1040 (2015) (finding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was not violated by same-sex marriage prohibitions or the states’ 
definition of marriage under rational basis review and granting certiorari); 
MARRIAGE EQUALITY 2009 
the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits.12 The judges who 
overruled bars found that they violated the Due Process or the 
Equal Protection Clauses.13  
In December 2013, a Utah federal trial level jurist was the 
first to eliminate a ban.14 The next month, an Oklahoma district 
court rejected a bar.15 In February 2014, Texas and Virginia 
district court judges nullified the states’ bans.16 That March, a 
Michigan district ruled that its laws were not constitutional.17 In 
May, Idaho, Oregon and Pennsylvania district court jurists 
invalidated the states’ bars.18 During June, Wisconsin and Indiana 
                                                                                                     
Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 672 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 
(2014) (affirming judgments from Indiana and Wisconsin invalidating laws 
prohibiting same-sex marriages); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 495–96 (9th Cir. 
2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2931 (2015) (affirming invalidation of an Idaho law 
banning same-sex marriage for its violation of the Equal Protection Clause); 
Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1229–30 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 190 L. 
Ed. 2d 138 (2014) (finding that Utah laws prohibiting same-sex marriage were 
unconstitutional); Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1074 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014) (affirming a decision that a provision of the 
Oklahoma Constitution preventing the issuing of marriage licenses to same-sex 
couples was unconstitutional).  
 12. See AFJ, supra note 10 (discussing that appellants in these circuits did 
not receive rulings before the Justices decided).  
 13. See infra note 32 (citing cases in which some type of elevated scrutiny 
was applied). 
 14. See Kitchen, 916 F. Supp. 2d at 1216 (“[T]he Constitution protects the 
Plaintiffs’ fundamental rights, which include the right to marry and the right to 
have that marriage recognized by their government.”). 
 15. See Bishop, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 1296 (“The Court declares that Part A of 
the Oklahoma Constitutional Amendment violates the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by precluding same-sex 
couples from receiving an Oklahoma marriage license.”).  
 16. See DeLeon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 639–40  (W.D. Tex. 2014), aff’d 
sub nom. DeLeon v. Abbott, 791 F.3d 619 (5th Cir. 2015) (finding that Texas’s 
failure to recognize same-sex marriages from other states lacked a rational basis 
and was therefore unconstitutional); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 
483– 84 (E.D. Va. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 
2014) (concluding that the provision of the Virginia Constitution and the specific 
statute at issue were unconstitutional due to the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 17. See DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 775 (E.D. Mich. 2014), rev’d, 
772 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 2014) (using rational basis review, decided that a provision 
of the Michigan Constitution precluding adoption by same-sex couples was 
unconstitutional).  
 18. See Latta v. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1086–87 (D. Idaho 2014), aff’d, 
771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding by a Magistrate Judge that Idaho laws that 
2010 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2005 (2018) 
district courts rejected their bans.19 That July, Colorado and 
Kentucky district judges struck down their jurisdictions’ laws.20 In 
August, a Florida district court found its bar unconstitutional.21 
During October, Alaska, Arizona, North Carolina and Wyoming 
district court jurists held that the states’ bans lacked 
constitutionality.22 Throughout November, Missouri, Kansas, 
South Carolina, West Virginia, Montana, Mississippi and 
Arkansas district judges invalidated bars.23 In January 2015, 
                                                                                                     
limited same-sex marriage were invalid); Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 
1128, 1146–47 (D. Or. 2014) (declaring statutes and constitutional provisions 
limiting marriage to opposite sex couples unconstitutional); Whitewood v. Wolf, 
992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 431–32 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (deciding that Pennsylvania’s 
opposite-sex only definition of marriage and failure to recognize same-sex 
marriages performed elsewhere are unconstitutional).  
 19. See Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1028 (W.D. Wis. 2014), aff’d sub 
nom. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014) (finding that statutory and 
constitutional provisions defining marriage as between a husband and wife were 
unconstitutional); Baskin v. Bogan, 12 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1164–65 (S.D. Ind. 2014), 
aff’d, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014) (ruling Indiana’s same-sex marriage ban 
unconstitutional).   
 20. See Burns v. Hickenlooper, No. 14-cv-01817-RM-KLM, 2014 WL 
3634834, at *5 (D. Colo. July 23, 2014) (granting temporary injunction for six 
same-sex couples married elsewhere whose marriages were not recognized by the 
state of Colorado); Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 556–57 (W.D. Ky. 
2014), rev’d sub nom. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014) (using even 
a deferential standard of review, Kentucky’s laws preventing recognition of valid 
same-sex marriages were found to be unconstitutional). 
 21. See Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1293 (N.D. Fla. 2014) (using 
reasoning similar to Windsor, the court found that Florida’s statutory provisions 
preventing recognition of same-sex marriages were unconstitutional). 
 22. See Hamby v. Parnell, 56 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1073  (D. Alaska 2014) 
(declaring Alaska same-sex marriage laws unconstitutional for their failure to 
comply with the Fourteenth Amendment); Majors v. Horne, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1313, 
1315 (D. Ariz. 2014) (deciding that Arizona statutory and constitutional 
provisions fail to provide equal protection to same-sex couples and are therefore 
unconstitutional); Gen. Synod of United Church of Christ v. Resinger, 12 F. Supp. 
3d 790, 792 (W.D.N.C. 2014) (ordering a permanent injunction against 
enforcement of any North Carolina laws that deny equal rights to same-sex 
couples); Fisher-Borne v. Smith, 14 F. Supp. 3d 695, 698 (M.D.N.C. 2014) 
(declaring unconstitutional North Carolina laws that fail to recognize legal 
marriages performed out of state and prohibitions against same-sex marriage); 
Guzzo v. Mead, No. 14-CV- 200-SWS, 2014 WL 5317797, at *8–9 (D. Wyo. Oct. 17, 
2014) (granting a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of any Wyoming 
laws that deny marriage or legal recognition to same-sex couples).  
 23. See Marie v. Moser, 65 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1206 (D. Kan. 2014) 
(authorizing preliminary injunction against Kansas laws prohibiting the state 
MARRIAGE EQUALITY 2011 
South Dakota and Alabama district courts rejected bans, while 
that March, a Nebraska district jurist did so.24  
Many states appealed.25 The Fifth Circuit heard January 2015 
oral arguments from its three jurisdictions26 while Alabama and 
Florida appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, but neither of the 
                                                                                                     
from issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples); Lawson v. Kelly, 58 F. Supp. 
3d 923, 935–36 (W.D. Mo. 2014) (finding Missouri laws denying same-sex 
marriage rights fail rational basis review and contravene the Constitution); 
Condon v. Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572, 589 (D.S.C. 2014) (granting permanent 
injunctive relief against South Carolina laws denying same-sex couples the same 
marriage rights as opposite-sex couples); Bradacs v. Haley, 58 F. Supp. 3d 514, 
532–33 (D.S.C. 2014) (declaring South Carolina laws that failed to recognize a 
valid same-sex marriage from a state where it was legally performed violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment); McGee v. Cole, 66 F. Supp. 3d 747, 760–61 (S.D.W. Va. 
2014) (deciding portions of the West Virginia Code prohibiting same-sex marriage 
were not narrow enough to achieve the stated goal and accordingly 
unconstitutional); Rolando v. Fox, 23 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1235–36 (D. Mont. 2014) 
(declaring any Montana laws that ban same-sex marriage unconstitutional due 
to the Fourteenth Amendment); Campaign for S. Equal. v. Bryant, 64 F. Supp. 3d 
906, 954 (S.D. Miss. 2014) (stating that the Mississippi ban on same-sex marriage 
was invalid for violation of due process and equal protection); Jernigan v. Crane, 
64 F. Supp. 3d 1260, 1287–89 (E.D. Ark. 2014), aff’d, 796 F.3d 976 (8th Cir. 2015) 
(deciding that laws preventing recognition of valid same-sex marriages performed 
outside Arkansas and preventing same-sex marriage within the state were 
unconstitutional).  
 24. See Rosenbrahn v. Daugaard, 61 F. Supp. 3d 862, 877 (D.S.D. 2015) 
(deciding that the statutory and constitutional provisions in South Dakota 
banning same-sex marriage violated the Constitution); Searcy v. Strange, 81 F. 
Supp. 3d 1285, 1290–91 (S.D. Ala. 2015) (finding Alabama laws prohibiting 
same-sex marriage unconstitutional); Waters v. Ricketts, 48 F. Supp. 3d 1271, 
1291 (D. Neb. 2015), aff’d, 798 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 2015) (seeking invalidation of a 
Nebraska law prohibiting same-sex marriage and the recognition of legal 
marriages from other jurisdictions).  
 25. See, e.g., Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 791 F.3d 616, 617–18 (5th Cir. 2015) 
(appealing a district court ruling, the state of Louisiana sought from the Fifth 
Circuit reinstatement of a same-sex marriage ban). 
 26. See Andy Grimm, Listen Here for the 5th Circuit’s Hearing on Louisiana’s 
Gay Marriage Case, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Jan. 9, 2015, 3:10 PM), 
https://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/01/listen_online_to_audio_louisia.h
tml (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (describing oral arguments made by Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and Texas before the Fifth Circuit) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); Lauren McGaughey, Judges Question Texas’ Interest in 
Banning Gay Marriage, HOUS. CHRON. (Jan. 9, 2015, 3:19 PM), 
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/texas/article/Appeals-
court-judges-6004718.php (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (discussing oral arguments 
before the Fifth Circuit questioning Texas’s ban on same-sex marriage) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see supra notes 10, 16. 
2012 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2005 (2018) 
tribunals ruled before the Supreme Court decided.27 Idaho and 
Alaska pursued Ninth Circuit en banc review and certiorari, but 
the court denied the requests.28 Some district courts partially 
invalidated bars.29  
Most judges depended on analogous reasoning while citing 
prior circuit and district court opinions.30 The jurists found that 
the bans contravened the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
or Equal Protection Clause.31 They differed more over the rigor of 
                                                                                                     
 27. See Lyle Denniston, Eleventh Circuit Puts Off Same-Sex Marriage Cases, 
SCOTUSBLOG, (Feb. 5, 2015, 7:31 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/02/eleventh-circuit-puts-off-same-sex-marriage-
cases/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (stating that the Eleventh Circuit placed any 
same-sex marriage cases on hold while waiting for a Supreme Court ruling on the 
issue) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Steve Rothaus, 
Same-Sex Marriage Could Begin in Florida Jan. 6 After Appeals Court Decision, 
TAMPA BAY TIMES, https://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/civil/11th-circuit-
court-of-appeals-refuses-to-extend-ban-on-same-sex-marriage/2208838 (last 
updated Dec. 5, 2014) (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (detailing the Eleventh Circuit’s 
decision not to extend a stay after previously finding Florida’s same-sex marriage 
ban unconstitutional) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 28. See Hamby v. Parnell, 56 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1073 (D. Alaska 2014), stay 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 399 (2014) (following an injunction in Alaska, a stay was 
requested and denied by the Court); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 495–96  (9th 
Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2931 (2015) (describing the invalidation of the 
same-sex marriage ban in Idaho); Chris Johnson, Idaho, Alaska Seek Full Ninth 
Circuit Review of Marriage Rulings, WASH. BLADE (Oct. 23, 2014, 1:17 AM), 
http://www.washingtonblade.com/2014/10/23/idaho-alaska-seek-full-ninth-
circuit-review-marriage-rulings/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (describing Alaska and 
Idaho pursuit of en banc review from the Ninth Circuit) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 29. See Henry v. Himes, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1061–62 (S.D. Ohio 2014) 
(ruling required Ohio to recognize same-sex marriages that were valid where 
entered); Tanco v. Haslam, 7 F. Supp. 3d 759, 772 (M.D. Tenn. 2014) (granting a 
preliminary injunction preventing Tennessee from enforcing Anti-Recognition 
Laws against the six plaintiffs); Baskin v. Bogan, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1029 (S.D. 
Ind. 2014) (authorizing a preliminary injunction in Indiana that would later 
become permanent); Love v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536, 550 (W.D. Ky. 2014) 
(declaring Kentucky laws that deny same-sex marriage rights unenforceable). 
 30. See, e.g., Latta v. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1067–68 (D. Idaho 2014) 
(concluding that Idaho laws banning same-sex marriage were unconstitutional 
while citing cases like Bostic v. Rainey from Virginia, Kitchen v. Herbert from 
Utah, and Bishop v. U.S. from Oklahoma). 
 31. See supra note 11 (citing cases from the Fourth and Tenth Circuits that 
premised their decisions on due process as well as the Seventh and Ninth Circuits 
which relied on equal protection). 
MARRIAGE EQUALITY 2013 
scrutiny to apply. A number invoked diverse types of elevated 
review, while a few deployed strict scrutiny and many used the 
rational basis test.32  
In October, the Supreme Court denied certiorari of Fourth, 
Seventh and Tenth Circuit determinations.33 In short, the vast 
majority of judges rejected bars, and numerous jurists depended 
on heightened scrutiny.34 
III. Marriage Equality Litigation and Marriage Equality’s 
Implementation 
A. The Fourth Circuit 
This Part evaluates Judge Wright Allen’s opinion which 
struck down Virginia marriage laws,35 the Fourth Circuit ruling 
that affirmed her determination36 and how the other Fourth 
Circuit states, district jurists and the Justices treated the 
marriage equality question. 
                                                                                                     
 32. See Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 655–56 (7th Cir. 2014) (adopting an 
elevated scrutiny test in the Seventh Circuit to examine the constitutionality of a 
same-sex marriage ban); Latta, 771 F.3d at 468 (employing elevated scrutiny as 
the standard for the Ninth Circuit); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 374–77 (4th 
Cir. 2014) (establishing a strict scrutiny standard to evaluate same-sex marriage 
prohibitions in the Fourth Circuit); see also Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. 
Supp. 2d 921, 994–98 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (using rational basis as the standard of 
review in California for Proposition Eight); infra notes 81–117 (discussing Bostic 
v. Shaefer in greater depth).  
 33. Salgado-Silver v. U.S., 135 S. Ct. 134 (2014) (mem.); see AFJ, supra note 
10, at 5, 13, 22 (discussing the denial of certiorari in the Fourth, Seventh, and 
Tenth Circuits resulting in legalized same-sex marriage in those circuits as well 
as Arizona, Colorado, Montana, Nevada, West Virginia and Wyoming, even as 
Alaska, Kansas and North and South Carolina did not legalize same-sex marriage 
until courts ruled). 
 34. See Franklin, supra note 1, at 872 (discussing cases which applied 
heightened scrutiny as the standard). 
 35. See Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 483–84 (E.D. Va. 2014) 
(writing the opinion in this case, Judge Wright Allen declared Virginia statues 
and a constitutional provision banning same-sex marriage unconstitutional). 
 36. See Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 384 (4th Cir. 2014) (affirming Judge 
Wright Allen’s ruling, the Fourth Circuit similarly held that Virginia’s ban on 
same-sex marriage violated the Fourteenth Amendment). 
2014 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2005 (2018) 
1. Virginia Litigation 
a. Eastern District Opinion 
In July 2013, plaintiffs contested Virginia’s bans; in February 
2014, she rejected the bars.37 The district judge invoked Loving v. 
Virginia,38 proclaiming that the United States has followed a 
difficult, sometimes “painful and poignant,” sojourn to make and 
keep its people free39 and that barring citizens from marrying 
someone whom they love violates due process and equal 
protection.40  
She found that the General Assembly had revised the code in 
1997 to ban same-sex marriage,41 and during 2004, after a few 
states rejected bars, it proposed a constitutional amendment to ban 
same-sex marriage that the voters duly ratified over 2006.42 
During January 2014, State Registrar of Vital Records Janet 
Rainey and Democratic Attorney General Mark Herring tendered 
a change in position.43 The jurist easily determined that plaintiffs 
possessed standing44 and ruled that the Justices’ summary 
                                                                                                     
 37. See Bostic, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 483–84 (explaining Judge Wright Allen’s 
finding that the Virginia laws were unconstitutional resulting in an order 
enjoining the Commonwealth from enforcing laws prohibiting same-sex 
marriage).  
 38. See id. at 460 (“[A]ll Americans, no matter their race, . . . sex, 
[or] . . . sexual orientation, should have that same freedom to marry. Government 
has no business imposing some people’s religious beliefs over others . . . . I 
support the freedom to marry for all.” (citing Mildred Loving, Public Statement 
on Loving’s 40th Anniversary (June 12, 2007))).   
 39. See id. (explaining that the U.S. was having a spirited debate about who 
enjoys the right to marry).  
 40. See id. at 460–61 (asserting the ultimate exercise of freedom is choice, 
applying strict scrutiny and declaring one of a court’s noblest endeavors is 
analyzing laws “rooted in unlawful prejudice”). 
 41. See id. at 464 (including voiding out-of-state marriages (citing VA. CODE 
ANN. § 20– 45.2)). 
 42. See id. at 465 (describing the ratification of VA. CONST. art. I. § 15-A 
known as the “Marshall/Newman Amendment”). 
 43. See id. at 461 (relinquishing a prior defense, the Prince William Clerk, 
who intervened, adopted a prior motion and supporting briefs of Rainey). 
 44. See id. at 466–68 (finding the required elements of standing existed 
including: injury in fact from stigmatic injuries, casual connection between the 
state official denying marriage licenses and the injury, and redressability if an 
MARRIAGE EQUALITY 2015 
disposition—“for want of a substantial federal question”—in Baker 
v. Nelson45 did not preclude her exercising jurisdiction.46 
She observed that the Constitution protects all fundamental 
rights within “liberty” from state invasion,47 declaring that the 
right to marry was clearly “a rigorously protected fundamental 
right,” because the Court had long recognized that due process and 
equal protection safeguard the marriage right.48 She then rejected 
the allegation that plaintiffs sought to “create and exercise a new” 
right, as they were pursuing the same one that heterosexuals 
enjoy.49 Because marriage is a personal, sacred decision, judges 
must carefully ensure that bans are not an “unwarranted 
government interference” with this choice.50  
She found that marriage regulation was generally presumed 
valid and upheld when “rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest[,]” but that strict scrutiny applied to a fundamental 
right,51 which demanded that regulation be “narrowly tailored to 
serve a compelling state interest.”52 Because marriage was a 
fundamental right, the court assessed the laws to discern whether 
they met this test.53 The judge first reviewed traditions and the 
defendant’s claim that the bans discourage people from abusing 
                                                                                                     
injunction were issued).  
 45. 405 U.S. 810 (1972) (mem.) 
 46. See Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 466–70 (E.D. Va. 2014) (joining 
many others deciding marriage equality cases who held “doctrinal developments 
since 1971 compel the conclusion” that Baker is no longer binding (citing Baker v. 
Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (mem.))).  
 47. See id. at 470 (citation omitted). 
 48. Id. at 470–71 (elaborating that this cannot be divorced from the right to 
privacy and intimate association and reciting Griswold v. Connecticut’s paean to 
“marriage’s noble purposes” (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 
(1965))). 
 49. Id. at 472 (explaining that each publicly commits to join an exclusive 
relationship and create a family with a partner who shares an intimate, 
sustaining emotional bond). 
 50. Bostic, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 472–73 (citations omitted). 
 51. Id. at 473 (explaining that it is deeply rooted in U.S. history and implicit 
in ordered liberty, so “neither liberty, nor justice” exists without it, and protects 
making “deeply personal choices about love and family free from government 
interference” (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997))). 
 52. Id. (citations omitted); see supra note 32 and accompanying text.  
 53. See id. at 473 (citations omitted). 
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marriage rights by wedding to secure benefits and determined that 
it lacked “any rational basis.”54 She stressed the laws’ history, 
prompting the “inescapable” conclusion that the state interest was 
to “avoid ‘radical changes’ that would [diminish a] long-held view” 
of marriage, even though the Justices have rejected the notion that 
a prevalent moral conviction alone supports a “constitutionally 
infirm law.”55  
The jurist then explored the second interest, federalism,56 but 
said that courts must intervene when states violate the 
fundamental right to marry and Windsor’s Loving citation was a 
“disclaimer of enormous proportion.”57 She found that Windsor 
invoked the Constitution to safeguard LGBT individuals’ rights 
and the propriety of applying this protection remained crucial 
when analyzing state laws’ validity.58 The judge deemed meritless 
the assertion that she must postpone review in deference to 
supposed legislative or citizen action, as this ignored the 
continuing harm which LGBT persons suffer and the prejudice and 
stigma that are visited upon their children while awaiting 
change.59  
The jurist addressed a third rationale, “for-the-children,” 
which urged that “responsible procreation and ‘optimal child 
rearing’ are legitimate interests that support” the bans, yet this 
                                                                                                     
 54. Id. at 474 (stating that a legal idea’s ancient lineage does not immunize 
it “from attack for lacking a rational basis” (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 
326 (1993))). 
 55. Id. at 474–75 (explaining that this was not advanced by excluding people 
from marriage based on sexual orientation, and stating Loving treated similar 
concerns but rejected Virginia’s interracial marriage ban, despite its lengthy 
existence). 
 56. See id. at 475–76 (intoning Windsor’s exposition on federal deference to 
state law policymaking regarding domestic relations, she said that states properly 
enjoy this power and federal intervention was best used rarely). 
 57. See id. at 476 (signaling that “due process and equal protection 
guarantees must trump objections to federal intervention”). 
 58. See id. (invoking Justice Scalia’s Windsor dissent, like the Utah district 
judge); supra notes 9, 14 and accompanying text. 
 59. See id. at 476–77 (stating that the long amendment process and despite 
the wisdom in usually deferring to states on domestic relations, courts must act 
“when core civil rights are at stake”); id. at 477 n.11 (explaining that the Virginia 
constitution creates a barrier by requiring majorities in both chambers in more 
than one legislative year, both before and after elections for House Delegates). 
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failed two chief tests.60 Preventing same-sex marriage did not 
advance these, as the bars needlessly deprived the thousands of 
children whom same-sex partners rear of marriage’s stability, 
protection, recognition and legitimacy.61 She found research 
demonstrates that LGBT couples are equally capable of having 
well-adjusted children.62 Wright Allen declared that the rationale 
was based on an unfounded, hurtful presumption, and legislating 
a state-sanctioned preference for one parenting model is 
unconstitutional.63 That interest also nominally justified the bans, 
because directly recognizing LGBT peoples’ fundamental right to 
marry cannot affect whether other individuals decide to marry or 
how they would rear families.64 The judge also observed that this 
misconstrues the values and dignity intrinsic to the marriage right 
as essentially a “vehicle for ‘responsibly’ breeding ‘natural’ 
offspring” by ignoring marriage’s profound non-procreative 
facets.65  
She determined that the bans distinctly violated equal 
protection for the same reasons—the laws “significantly interfere 
with a fundamental right” and lack narrow tailoring to effectuate 
                                                                                                     
 60. Id. at 477–78 (explaining that the for-the-children rationale failed both 
strict scrutiny and rational basis testing); see supra note 32 and accompanying 
text (citing cases in which strict scrutiny or rational basis were used as the 
standard of review).  
 61. See id. at 478 (“Children raised by gay or lesbian parents are as likely as 
children raised by heterosexual parents to be healthy, successful and 
well-adjusted.” (quoting Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 980 (N.D. 
Cal. 2010))). 
 62. See id.   
 63. See id. (citing Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 980 (N.D. 
Cal. 2010)) (“[S]ame-sex couples have happy, satisfying relationships and form 
deep emotional bonds and strong commitments to their partners.”). Thus, the 
rationale was based on an unfounded, hurtful presumption, and legislating a 
state-sanctioned preference for one parenting model is unconstitutional. Id. at 
479. 
 64. See id. at 478 (stating that the Defendant’s argument is a “profound 
distortion” of what the Plaintiff seeks). The argument also failed, as it would 
jeopardize the legitimacy of persons who do not procreate. Id. at 478–79.  
 65. Id. at 479. These included “expressions of emotional support,” personal 
dedication, public commitment and “spiritual significance.” Id. (citing Turner v. 
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95–96 (1987)). In short, the ban did not advance the 
compelling state interests in supporting and protecting children by denying 
marriage’s benefits, dignity and worth simply due to gender. Id. at 480.  
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only sufficiently critical state interests.66 Even absent a 
determination that plaintiffs could invoke a fundamental right, the 
jurist said that the measures violated equal protection because the 
strictures treated differently persons “standing in the same 
relation to” them.67 
The judge examined what level of scrutiny to apply, 
proclaiming that deference was clearly unwarranted, as she 
discerned reasonable bases to suspect “prejudice against discrete 
and insular minorities” which severely curtail operation of political 
processes normally depended on to safeguard them.68 The jurist 
cited Lawrence v. Texas69 for the idea that powerful voices have 
long disparaged “homosexual conduct as immoral,” condemnation 
manifested in state-sanctioned actions.70 She canvassed scrutiny 
levels and tests, considered the reasons that advocates provided 
for the marriage laws, found that the bans exhibited no rational 
relation to a legitimate purpose and, thus, were invalid under even 
the least rigorous scrutiny.71 The measures’ goal and result 
deprived LGBT people of the right to “celebrate, in marriage, a 
loving, rewarding, monogamous relationship with a partner to 
whom they are committed for life.”72 
The judge urged that legislation ensuring marriage affords 
“profound legal, financial, and social benefits, and exacts serious” 
identical duties, but government participation in granting 
marriage advantages needs to withstand scrutiny.73 Laws failing 
constitutional scrutiny must fall, despite their religious heritage’s 
depth and legitimacy.74 She was compelled to rule that the bans 
                                                                                                     
 66. Id.; supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.  
 67. Bostic, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 480.  
 68. Id. at 481 (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 
n.4 (1938)). 
 69. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
 70. Bostic, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 481 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
571 (2003)). 
 71. See id. at 481–82 (“Virginia’s Marriage Laws fail to display a rational 
relationship to a legitimate purpose . . . .”). Thus, she “need not address Plaintiffs’ 
compelling arguments” for elevated scrutiny. Id. at 482. 
 72. Id. They advance no legitimate state purpose. Id.  
 73. Id. at 483. 
 74. See id. (stating that the government’s involvement in marriage must 
withstand constitutional scrutiny).  
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unconstitutionally deny LGBT persons the fundamental marriage 
right, as the state’s proffered interests must yield to cherished 
safeguards which assure that citizens may exercise private choices 
“regarding love and family.”75 
This disposition respected the country’s tradition of freedom, 
while America’s checkered “but dogged journey toward” truer 
freedoms has continually given the United States deeper 
appreciation of the Constitution’s first three words: “we the 
people.”76 The jurist said that “[j]ustice has often been forged from 
fires of indignities and prejudices suffered,” and that the nation’s 
triumphs which celebrate “freedom of choice are hallowed.”77 She 
declared, we have reached another moment “when We the People 
becomes more inclusive, and our freedom more perfect.”78 
b. Fourth Circuit Majority Opinion 
                                                                                                     
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. pmbl.). “‘We the People’ have become a broader, 
more diverse family than once imagined.” Id. (citation omitted). 
 77. Id. at 483–84. 
 78. Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 484 (E.D. Va. 2014). She invoked 
Abraham Lincoln’s 1860s statement: people “whose voices join in noble harmony 
with Plaintiffs today, [seek] fairness only [that] so far as it is in this Court’s 
power . . . [they shall] have.” Id. She invalidated and enjoined laws barring 
same-sex marriages. Id.  
Judge Wright recently ruled on an important transgender rights issue in 
Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board, 302 F. Supp. 3d 730 (E.D. Va. 2018). 
A transgender high school student had sued the school board, alleging that its 
policy of assigning students to restrooms based on their biological sex violated 
Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 
738. Judge Robert Doumar dismissed the Title IX claim and denied the student’s 
request for a preliminary injunction. Id. The Court of Appeals reversed in part 
and vacated in part, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated and 
remanded for consideration of the Title IX claim. Id. Judge Wright Allen found 
that the student’s allegations were sufficient to show that the school board’s policy 
subjected him to sex discrimination under a gender stereotyping theory in 
violation of Title IX, applying intermediate scrutiny, and that the policy caused 
the student harm. Id. at 748. She thus denied the school board’s motion to 
dismiss. Id. Judge Wright also denied the motion to dismiss the equal protection 
claim. Id. at 750. 
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The case was swiftly appealed.79 The panel, comprising Judges 
Paul Niemeyer, Roger Gregory and Henry Floyd, conducted May 
oral arguments.80 The court issued a July opinion that Floyd wrote, 
which affirmed the lower court’s ruling.81 Floyd deemed standing 
easily met 82 and posited that Windsor’s Supreme Court resolution 
“without mentioning Baker [spoke] volumes” about the case’s 
relevance, while its due process and equal protection opinions since 
Baker were even more instructive.83 
The panel stated that Fourteenth Amendment claims’ review 
includes two elements.84 The court must determine the level of 
analysis to use—either rational basis, or certain heightened 
evaluation, namely strict scrutiny—and apply this to marriage 
laws.85 Floyd said that putative interference with a fundamental 
right merits strict scrutiny under the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses, stating that bans violate a right derived from 
the amendment’s “protection of individual liberty . . . includ[ing] 
the fundamental right to marry.”86 Because this encompasses 
                                                                                                     
 79. See Markus Schmidt, In Procedural Step, Va. Appeals Marriage Case, 
RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Feb. 24, 2014), https://www.richmond.com/news/virginia/ 
in-procedural-step-va-appeals-marriage-case/article_af81dd88-9da4-11e3-86ef-
0017a43b2370.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (stating that the appeal was 
expedited) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 80. Robert Barnes, Appeals Court Judges Seem Sharply Divided Over 
Virginia Ban on Same-Sex Marriage, WASH. POST (May 13, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/appeals-court-to-hear-arguments-on-
virginia-ban-on-gay-marriage/2014/05/12/38b64ada-da13-11e3-8009-
71de85b9c527_story.html?utm_term=.c1bfd4464e10 (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 81. See Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 367 (4th Cir. 2014) (“Virginia’s 
same-sex marriage bans impermissibly infringe on its citizens’ fundamental right 
to marry . . . .”). Gregory joined Floyd, while Niemeyer dissented. Id. 
 82. See id. at 370–72 (finding that “each of the Plaintiffs has standing as to 
at least one defendant”).  
 83. Id. at 374. Judge Floyd viewed the case like many other judges, saying 
that Baker’s abandonment and later doctrinal developments meant that Baker 
was not binding. Id. at 373–75; supra note 45.  
 84. See id. at 375 (stating that the court must determine what level of 
scrutiny to apply, and whether the Virginia Marriage Laws satisfy the scrutiny 
test applied).  
 85. See id. (“We therefore begin by assessing whether the Virginia Marriage 
Laws infringe on a fundamental right.”).  
 86. Id. (citations omitted). 
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same-sex marriage, the panel found that Washington v. 
Glucksberg87 was inapt, as that decision only governs recognition 
of new fundamental rights.88  
He claimed that Loving v. Virginia89 and other cases “speak of 
a broad right to marry,” which stretches to “accommodate changing 
societal norms,” reflecting the Justices’ view that it applies to 
individuals’ freedom of choice.90 When proponents asserted that 
the cases involved heterosexuals, so same-sex couples have less 
constitutional protection, Floyd said that Lawrence and Windsor 
indicated same-sex couples enjoy similar protection.91 Thus, strict 
scrutiny pertains “only when laws ‘significantly interfere’ with a 
fundamental right,”92 and they must be justified by 
narrowly-drawn compelling state interests.93 Advocates offered 
five putatively compelling interests.94 First, the federalism-based 
interest in defining and regulating marriage ostensibly justified 
the statutes,95 yet the panel ascertained that Windsor undercut 
this by providing laws which do so must respect the constitutional 
rights of persons.96  
                                                                                                     
 87. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 88. See Bostic, 760 F.3d at 376 (finding that the fundamental right to 
marriage includes same-sex marriage) (emphasis added). 
 89. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).   
 90. Bostic, 760 F.3d at 376 (citations omitted).  
 91. See id. at 377 (stating that same-sex marriages demand the same respect 
as opposite-sex marriages). Floyd rejected describing the right urged as one to 
same-sex marriage, citing both Lawrence and Windsor. Id. 
 92. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 377 (4th Cir. 2014). The Virginia 
Marriage Laws impede a fundamental right by denying same-sex couples 
marriage and voiding out-of-state marriages. Id. 
 93. See id. (“The Proponents bear the burden of demonstrating that the 
Virginia Marriage Laws satisfy this standard.”) (citation omitted). Proponents 
must show that Virginia Marriage Laws meet this test and depend on the laws’ 
actual purposes. Id. 
 94.  See id. at 377–78 (analyzing the Proponents’ counter-argument).  
 95. See id. at 378 (“The Constitution does not grant the federal government 
any authority over domestic relations matters, such as marriage.”). Floyd cited 
Windsor for the idea that states have long enjoyed “freedom to define and regulate 
marriage.” Id.  
 96. See id. at 379 (stating that Windsor emphasized that States may not 
impinge constitutional rights). Thus, states cannot encroach on the fundamental 
right to marry. Id. (citing Loving, 388 U.S. at 12).   
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Floyd found that Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative 
Action97 did not alter the result that Windsor dictated.98 Schuette 
emphasized the need to honor the voters’ policy choice when 
amending the state constitution, and proponents argued that the 
opinion governed Virginia’s revision.99 However, the people’s will 
did not comprise “an independent compelling interest that 
warrants depriving same-sex couples of their fundamental right to 
marry.”100 Thus, the federalism-based interest when defining 
marriage and respect for the democratic process that codified this 
failed to excuse infringing marriage rights.101 History and tradition 
were also lacking,102 as the Court advised that a legal construct’s 
ancient lineage did not immunize the concept.103  
Advocates claimed that deviation from opposite-sex marriage 
would destabilize the institution by severing the 
marriage-procreation link.104 The notions were unfounded for two 
reasons.105 First, Griswold v. Connecticut106 rejected the theory 
that marriage only involves procreation by upholding wedded 
couples’ right to not do so and treating a view of marriage that 
lacked a relationship to children.107 Second, this idea primarily 
                                                                                                     
 97. 572 U.S. 291 (2014).  
 98. See Bostic, 760 F.3d at 379 (comparing Schuette to Windsor) (citing 
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1629 (2014)). 
 99. See id. (stating that votes are “essential to our democracy”).  
 100. Id. (citation omitted); see infra notes 214–217 and accompanying text. 
 101. See Bostic, 760 F.3d at 379–80 (“[T]he people’s will is not an independent 
compelling interest . . . .”).  
 102. See id. at 380 (stating that preserving history and tradition is not a 
compelling interest). 
 103. See Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 380 (4th Cir. 2014) (rejecting the 
Proponents’ argument) citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993))). This obtains, 
even under rational basis review. Id. Thus, conserving the “historical and 
traditional status quo” was not compelling. Id. Lawrence similarly disparaged the 
related idea of fostering moral principles. Id. 
 104. See id. (arguing that same-sex marriage will establish the idea that 
marriage is for emotional fulfillment).  
 105. See id. at 380–81 (“[I]f adults are the focal point of marriage, ‘then no 
logical grounds reinforce stabilizing norms like sexual exclusivity . . . .’”). Floyd so 
found, even if he viewed the ideas “through rose-colored glasses.” Id.  
 106. 381 U.S. 479 (2001).  
 107. See Bostic, 760 F.3d at 380 (stating that marriage is more than just 
procreation). Floyd, like Wright Allen, cited Griswold’s classic description. Id. 
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rested on no-fault divorce’s legacy, an “unrelated legal change to 
marriage,”108 yet Floyd saw no reason why legalizing same-sex 
marriage would be similarly destabilizing.109 
Proponents also contended that the laws, by allowing only 
heterosexual marriages, provide stability for the kinds of 
relationships which lead to unplanned pregnancies, thus avoiding 
or curbing the negative effects often associated with unintended 
children.110 However, the measures were not properly tailored, as 
they were “woefully underinclusive”111 and failed because strict 
scrutiny demanded that a state’s means advance a compelling 
interest.112  
Advocates urged that children develop best when married 
biological parents rear them in a stable family unit with 
“gender-differentiated parenting.”113 Floyd deemed “extremely 
persuasive” the fact that no scientific evidence found that 
parenting efficacy was related to couples’ sexual orientation, and 
the laws actually harm offspring by stigmatizing their families and 
depriving children of marriage’s benefits.114 Floyd saw little need 
                                                                                                     
(citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86); supra note 47. 
 108. Bostic, 760 F.3d at 381. No-fault divorce altered marriage by facilitating 
couples’ ability to end relationships. Id. 
 109. See id. (stating that no-fault divorce made it easier for couples to 
separate). Floyd found more logical that same-sex couples want access to 
marriage to capitalize on marriage’s hallmarks, namely faithfulness and 
permanence. Id. Thus, marriages would strengthen the institution. Id.  
 110. See id. (“[C]hildren born to unwed parents face a ‘significant risk’ of being 
raised in unstable families . . . .”). 
 111. Id. “Same-sex couples are not the only [couples] who cannot reproduce 
accidentally.” Id. He analogized this to City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 
473 U.S. 432 (1985), in which permit denial that was so underinclusive it must 
have derived from “‘irrational prejudice,’ rendering the law unconstitutional,” and 
leading him “to draw the same conclusion.” Id. at 382.  
 112. See id. (“Prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying and ignoring their 
out-of-state marriages does not serve Virginia’s goal of preventing out-of-wedlock 
births.”) (citation omitted). Thus, barring same-sex marriage or voiding 
out-of-state same-sex marriages does not prevent out-of-wedlock births. Id. 
 113. Id. at 383. They are protected by “preventing same-sex couples from 
marrying and starting inferior families.” Id.  
 114. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 383–84 (4th Cir. 2014). They include 
stability, togetherness and economic security. Id. at 384; see Lisa Pryor, 
Heterosexuals Deserve Our Support, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/28/opinion/heterosexuals-deserve-our-
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to resolve this dispute, as elevated scrutiny: (1) rejected laws with 
overbroad generalizations about groups’ differing “talents, 
capacities or preferences”115 and (2) required congruity between a 
statute’s means and end, that was lacking.116  
In the end, the panel held Virginia bans unconstitutional, thus 
affirming the district court.117 The appeals court recognized that 
“same-sex marriage makes some people deeply uncomfortable,” 
but this was not a legitimate reason for denying same-sex couples 
the intensely personal choice to marry, which can alter the “course 
of an individual’s life,” because that prevented full societal 
participation.118  
c. Fourth Circuit Dissenting Opinion 
Judge Niemeyer said that the case involved whether a state 
decision to not recognize same-sex marriage violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment, so the court must only apply established 
constitutional tenets.119 He criticized the majority for proclaiming, 
“ipse dixit, that the fundamental right to marry” included same-sex 
marriage and, thus, enjoyed due process protection, because the 
jurists “bypassed the relevant constitutional analysis,” which 
Glucksberg mandated, by finding it unnecessary, as they were 
recognizing “no new fundamental right.”120  
                                                                                                     
support.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (studying the effects that same-sex 
marriages have on childrearing) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 115. Bostic, 760 F.3d at 384 (citing U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533–34 
(1996)). 
 116. See id. (“There is absolutely no reason to suspect that prohibiting 
same-sex couples from marrying . . . will cause same-sex couples to raise fewer 
children . . . .”). Because all justifications failed, the laws could not satisfy this 
scrutiny. Id. 
 117. Id.   
 118. Id. This was exactly the kind of segregation that the Fourteenth 
Amendment proscribes. Id.   
 119. It was not about whether judges “favor or disfavor same-sex marriage” 
or whether state choices are “good policy.” Id. at 385 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). 
 120. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (evaluating the proper level of 
judicial scrutiny). Bostic, 760 F.3d at 385–86 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (citing 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721).   
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Because the right to marry excluded same-sex marriage and a 
Glucksberg analysis failed to yield any new fundamental right, the 
laws must be upheld if they have a rational basis.121 This test 
grants legislatures “heavy deference” and only explores whether 
the classification is “rationally related to legitimate governmental 
goals”122 while holding that measures possess a “strong 
presumption of validity and those attacking” the classification’s 
rationality “have the burden ‘to negative every conceivable basis 
which might support [it].’”123 This approach allows lawmakers’ 
choices to be premised on reasonable speculation, rather than 
evidentiary or empirical support, recognizing that legislators are 
better equipped than judges to make these assessments.124 
Niemeyer cited Virginia’s reasons for enacting the bans, which 
included the contention that opposite sex marriages “provide a 
family structure by which to nourish and raise those children” and 
that “a biological family is a more stable environment.”125 
Niemeyer concluded that the laws satisfied due process because 
the laws had rational relationships to valid purposes.126  
The jurist then addressed equal protection.127 He treated the 
scrutiny levels but contended that “when a regulation adversely 
affects members of a class that is not suspect or quasi-suspect, the 
regulation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the 
                                                                                                     
 121. Bostic, 760 F.3d at 363. 
 122. Id. (citation omitted). 
 123. Id. (citation omitted). 
 124. See Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 395 (4th Cir. 2014) (Niemeyer, J., 
dissenting) (observing that legislators can formulate courses of action based on 
predictions). 
 125. Id. at 393 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). Virginia also asserted that its laws 
were rational based “on the biological connection of men and women; the potential 
for their having children; the family order needed in raising children; and, on a 
larger scale, the political order resulting from stable family units.” Id. at 395 
(Niemeyer, J., dissenting).  
 126. See id. at 395 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (“Because Virginia’s marriage 
laws are rationally related to its legitimate purposes, they withstand 
rational-basis scrutiny under the Due Process Clause.”).  
 127. See id. at 396 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (“[B]ecause I find no 
fundamental right is infringed by the laws, I also address discrimination under 
the Equal Protection Clause.”). The majority “did not substantively address the 
plaintiff’s second argument” regarding equal protection, as it found that the laws 
infringed on a due process right. Id.  
2026 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2005 (2018) 
classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest.”128 Plaintiffs argued that Virginia bans 
warranted elevated scrutiny, as the prohibitions “discriminate on 
the basis of sexual orientation,” yet recognized that the Supreme 
Court and the Fourth Circuit had not applied this level to 
classifications premised on sexual orientation.129 Niemeyer 
evaluated Romer, Windsor and Fourth Circuit opinions, 
determining that they and most other appellate courts had applied 
rational basis review.130 This precedent prompted Niemeyer to 
consider Virginia measures under that standard and to find that it 
was met.131 
Niemeyer summarized his dissent by powerfully disagreeing 
with the idea that same-sex marriage enjoyed the “same 
constitutional protections as the traditional right to marry.”132 
Because Niemeyer detected no fundamental right to same-sex 
marriage and rational reasons disfavoring recognition, he declared 
that courts must permit states to enact laws in accordance with 
their political views.133 
The majority denied a request to stay the ruling, but the 
Justices granted it while the defendants and the Attorney General 
swiftly appealed.134 The Court rejected each Bostic petition in early 
                                                                                                     
 128. Id. (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (citation and emphasis omitted). 
 129. Id. (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) 
 130. See id. at 396–97 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he [Romer] Court 
applied rational-basis review. . . . [In Windsor,] [t]he Court was presented an 
opportunity to alter the Romer standard but did not do so. . . . The vast majority 
of other courts of appeals have reached the same conclusion.”). 
 131. See id. at 398 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (“I would hold that Virginia’s 
marriage laws are subject to rational basis review. Applying that standard, I 
conclude that there is a rational basis for the laws.”).  
 132. Id. (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) 
 133. See id. (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (“[W]e, in the Third Branch, must allow 
the States to enact legislation on the subject in accordance with their political 
processes.”). Despite Niemeyer’s strong defense of Virginia’s marriage laws, the 
Court eventually invalidated them. See infra notes 199–239 (discussing the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)). 
 134. See McQuigg v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 32, 32 (2014) (mem.) (granting a stay 
pending the filing of a writ of certiorari); Alan Rappeport, Supreme Court Delays 
Gay Marriage in Virginia, A Day Before It Was Set to Begin, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 
2014, at A12 (explaining the sequence of events leading up to the Supreme Court’s 
last minute order to delay same-sex marriages in Virginia). 
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October, and marriages speedily commenced throughout 
Virginia.135 Plaintiffs also challenged similar North Carolina, 
South Carolina and West Virginia bans, which district judges then 
invalidated.136 
2. North Carolina Litigation 
In April 2014, plaintiffs attacked North Carolina bars on 
same-sex marriage.137 Judge William Osteen said that the 
pleadings showed that plaintiffs had standing and that the court 
had jurisdiction, while the defendant’s answer conceded that 
plaintiffs were “entitled to certain relief.”138 Based on the litigants’ 
briefs and representations, the state’s admissions, and Bostic, 
Osteen found the matter ripe for review.139 Osteen recognized that 
Bostic had explicitly declared Virginia bans on same-sex marriage 
unconstitutional.140 He cited opinions holding that a Fourth Circuit 
ruling on a legal issue bound all circuit districts,141 then assessed 
both states’ constitutional provisos and marriage laws and held 
them indistinguishable.142 The jurist allowed intervention by Phil 
                                                                                                     
 135. Schaefer v. Bostic, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014) cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 
308 (2014) (mem.); Rainey v. Bostic, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014) cert. denied 135 
S. Ct. 286 (2014) (mem.); McQuigg v. Bostic, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014) cert. 
denied 135 S. Ct. 31 (2014) (mem.). See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. 
 136. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. Assembly and citizen 
adoption of equality measures obviated the need for a Maryland case. See infra 
note 239 (discussing the implementation of marriage equality in Maryland). 
 137. See Fisher-Borne v. Smith, 14 F. Supp. 3d 695, 696 (M.D.N.C. 2014) 
(addressing challenges to the constitutionality of North Carolina’s laws 
preventing same-sex marriages). Plaintiffs also urged the courts to recognize 
“same-sex couples’ lawful out-of-state marriages.” Id.  
 138. Id. at 697.  
 139. See id. (“[M]atters [are] now ripe for ruling.”). 
 140. See id. (observing that the Virginia laws had also prevented the state 
from recognizing out of state marriages).   
 141. See id. at 697–98 (citations omitted) (citing five district court cases that 
invoke the doctrine of stare decisis). 
 142. See id. at 698 (citation omitted) (observing that the phrasing was similar, 
which “Bostic also recognized,” that the parties agreed that Bostic controlled, and 
invalidating and enjoining the laws).  
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Berger and Thom Tillis143 for the purpose of preserving an 
objection to his application of Bostic.144  
In April 2014, plaintiffs similarly challenged the same bars, 
and Western District Judge Max Cogburn ruled like Osteen.145 
Given Bostic, he upheld same-sex marriage.146 Cogburn found any 
law denying “same-sex couples the right to marry . . . or 
threaten[ing] clergy or other[s] who solemnize the union of 
same-sex couples” violated due process and equal protection under 
Bostic.147 He said that the question was not a political or moral 
issue, but a clearly settled legal one.148 
3. South Carolina Litigation 
In October 2014, a couple challenged South Carolina bans for 
contravening the fundamental right to marry, a liberty interest 
which due process and equal protection safeguard.149 Judge 
Richard Gergel rejected justiciability challenges 150 and some, 
                                                                                                     
 143. See id. at 697 (stating that Berger was House of Representatives Speaker 
and Tillis was Senate President Pro Tempore).  
 144. See id. at 710 (stating that the intervention decision was “very close”). 
 145. See Gen. Synod of the United Church of Christ v. Resinger, 12 F. Supp. 
3d 790, 791 (W.D.N.C. 2014) (holding that North Carolina’s marriage laws were 
unconstitutional under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses); Michael 
Paulson, State’s Gay-Marriage Ban is Challenged by Church, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 
2014, at A13 (describing the lawsuit filed by a national religious group in a 
challenge to the state’s marriage laws). 
 146. See Resinger, 12 F. Supp. 3d at 791 (invalidating and enjoining the bans).  
 147. Id. at 791. He also found laws barring the recognition of same sex 
marriages that were lawful in other states to be violative. See id. (finding all 
challenged aspects of the marriage laws to be unconstitutional).  
 148. See id. (“[I]t is clear as a matter of what is now settled law in the Fourth 
Circuit that North Carolina laws prohibiting same sex marriage . . . are 
unconstitutional.”). Berger and Tillis appealed both rulings, but after Obergefell 
issued, they filed dismissal motions that were granted in August 2015. See 
Fisher-Borne v. Moore, No. 14-2228 (4th Cir. dismissed Aug. 11, 2015) (granting 
dismissal motion); Gen. Synod of the United Church of Christ v. Moore, No. 
14-2225 (4th Cir. dismissed Aug. 11, 2015) (same). 
 149. See Condon v. Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572, 575 (D.S.C. 2014) (arguing that 
Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014), controlled).  
 150. See id. at 577–78 (rejecting a challenge to standing); supra note 44 and 
accompanying text.   
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although not all, of the defendants’ immunity claims.151 When 
assessing a right to marry, he invoked Windsor’s personhood and 
dignity notions and Justice Scalia’s dissent.152 Gergel remarked 
that a few appeals courts, and “most importantly for our purposes, 
the Fourth,” held bans violative 153 and the vast majority of district 
courts had rejected bans since Windsor’s issuance.154  
Gergel reasoned that Bostic, as a circuit opinion which the 
Justices did not alter, bound the circuit districts.155 He said that 
Bostic perceived the Virginia bars like South Carolina’s,156 found 
that Baker was not controlling,157 and held that plaintiffs enjoyed 
a fundamental right to marry,158 which meant that Virginia’s bans 
received strict scrutiny and thus could only be justified by a 
compelling state interest.159 He deftly rejected defendant’s 
                                                                                                     
 151. See Condon, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 578–79 (rejecting a defense of immunity 
by the state’s chief prosecutor, but dismissing claims against the state’s governor 
as barred by the Eleventh Amendment). The judge also rejected: (1) the 
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine’s use; (2) Younger abstention; and (3) the “domestic 
relations exception” to federal jurisdiction. See id. at 579–81, 584 (identifying and 
dismissing each of these arguments as presented). 
 152. See id. at 582 (stating that Justice Scalia urged that the Windsor decision 
would permit an assault on state bans); supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 153. See Condon, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 582 (citations omitted) (stating that the 
“Supreme Court . . . declined to grant review of the decisions of the Fourth, 
Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, leaving their judgments in place.”). 
 154. See id. (citations omitted) (“[A] clear majority of federal district courts 
that have addressed this issue have found state same-sex marriage bans 
unconstitutional.”); supra note 8 and accompanying text. The Sixth Circuit did 
reverse district opinions invalidating bans. See Condon, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 582 
(citations omitted) (listing lower court decisions overruled in Kentucky, Michigan, 
Ohio, and Tennessee). 
 155. See Condon, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 583 (citations omitted) (“[T]his Court finds 
most persuasive the clearly stated authority of the Fourth Circuit’s seminal 
decision in Bostic.”); supra notes 141, 146 and accompanying text. 
 156. See Condon, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 583 (stating that many parties and amici 
“exhaustively briefed” Bostic’s issues).  
 157. See id. (citation omitted) (arguing that later doctrinal developments 
eroded it); supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 158. See Condon, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 583–84 (stating that Bostic cited Loving, 
Zablocki, and Turner for establishing a “liberty interest in a broad right to marry” 
and Windsor and Lawrence for giving same-sex relationships due process 
protection).  
 159. See id. at 584 (stating that Bostic’s scrutiny of Virginia interests found 
none compelling).  
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contention that federalism and respect for voter and state 
prerogatives must trump plaintiffs’ liberty rights, as Bostic 
declared that the Fourteenth Amendment withdrew certain 
subjects from politics.160  
Gergel said that the Fourth, Seventh and Tenth Circuit 
appellants petitioned the Supreme Court, asserting most claims 
alleged below and in his case,161 but all were denied certiorari.162 
The judge reviewed developments in Fourth Circuit states with 
bars ascertaining that South Carolina alone banned same-sex 
marriage.163 He therefore carefully compared its laws’ wording and 
Virginia’s, finding “no meaningful distinction” from that which 
Bostic had rejected.164 Gergel addressed the state’s claim that he 
should not follow Bostic165 by saying that the Fourth Circuit had 
exhaustively treated the issues raised.166 Gergel urged that judicial 
decision-making’s predictability and stability required districts to 
enforce a circuit opinion which the Justices left undisturbed.167 
“This principle, along with the foundational rule that the United 
States Constitution is the supreme law of the land and state laws 
that run contrary to constitutionally protected rights of 
individuals” must fall, comprise the rule of law.168 The jurist 
                                                                                                     
 160. See Condon v. Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572, 585 (D.S.C. 2014) (arguing that 
Bostic placed the subjects beyond majorities’ reach, as the “right 
to . . . liberty . . . may not be submitted to a vote.” (citing Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 
F.3d 352, 379 (4th Cir. 2014))); see also infra note 220 and accompanying text 
(discussing why the judicial rulings were accepted and implemented relatively 
smoothly). 
 161. See Condon, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 585 (stating that one claim was Baker 
controlled); supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 162. See id. (adding that the Court lifted the stays); supra note 29 and 
accompanying text.  
 163. See id. at 586 (“[A]t the time Plaintiffs filed this action, South Carolina 
was the only state within the Fourth Circuit that continued to prohibit same sex 
marriage.”). 
 164. Id. 
 165. See id. (observing that the state argued that Baker should have bound 
the circuit, but that Windsor did not cite Baker when invalidating DOMA). 
 166. See id. (adding that Windsor also recognized a fundamental right to 
marry and court power to vindicate it).  
 167. See id. at 587 (“Coherent and consistent adjudication requires respect for 
the principle of stare decisis.”). 
 168. Id.  
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therefore held that Bostic governed and clearly established 
plaintiffs’ right to marry.169  
In August 2013, a same-sex couple who lawfully wed 
elsewhere had also challenged the bans, and Judge Michelle Childs 
heard the suit.170 In April 2014, the jurist stayed the case until the 
July Bostic circuit ruling.171 With the Supreme Court denial of 
Bostic appeals, Childs promptly lifted the stay.172 On November 10, 
the judge found that plaintiffs had standing to pursue legal 
recognition of their marriage and that the suit could proceed.173 
Childs rejected defendant’s arguments that she must defer to state 
courts on marital relations questions 174 and that Baker was 
binding.175  
Childs said that plaintiffs had a fundamental liberty interest 
in the right to marry; therefore, state bars to same-sex marriage 
required strict scrutiny and must be “narrowly tailored to a 
compelling government interest,” while the bans were not so 
defined and they clearly infringed this right.176 She found that the 
                                                                                                     
 169. See id. at 587–89 (finding that the state’s bans infringed on this right, 
enjoining them and denying the stay, but granting a temporary stay to allow 
orderly review, while also criticizing the Attorney General’s attempt to relitigate 
issues that Bostic had resolved).  
 170. See Bradacs v. Haley, 58 F. Supp. 3d 514, 518 (D.S.C. 2014) (asserting 
claims by a same-sex couple challenging the constitutionality of South Carolina’s 
laws denying legal protection to the marriages of same-sex couples who wed out 
of state).  
 171. See id. at 519 (recounting the procedural history of the suit); Condon v. 
Haley, No. 14-2241 (4th Cir. Nov. 18, 2014) (denying stay). 
 172. See Bradacs, 58 F. Supp. 3d at 520 (setting a two-week date for filing 
dispositive motions and later responses).  
 173. See id. at 520–25 (rejecting standing to oppose marriage license denial, 
a motion for judgment on the pleadings and a state immunity claim under an 
exception to Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).  
 174. See Bradacs, 58 F. Supp. 3d at 525–36 (stating that the South Carolina 
Supreme Court in South Carolina ex rel. Wilson v. Condon, 764 S.E.2d 247 (S.C. 
2014) made state judges defer to federal judges, while Loving found state power 
to regulate marriage limited).  
 175. See Bradacs, 58 F. Supp. 3d at 528 (reasoning that Bostic deemed Baker 
no longer binding and that Bostic, rather than Baker, bound her); supra note 45 
and accompanying text. 
 176. Bradacs, 58 F. Supp. 3d at 529, 530 (citation omitted). The bans also 
deserved strict scrutiny under equal protection claims, as they burden the 
fundamental right to marry. See id. (discussing the strict scrutiny standard and 
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interests asserted were like those that Virginia proffered in Bostic, 
which the opinion rejected.177  
4. West Virginia Litigation 
In 2014, same-sex couples disputed bars by suing clerks whom 
West Virginia laws prohibited from issuing licenses.178 Judge 
Robert Chambers said that the case was among many filed after 
Windsor179 and their pace had recently accelerated, culminating in 
the Supreme Court’s denials of appeals.180 Thus, he considered 
that this binding precedent and state and county officials’ 
acceptance of its effects provided a “clear blueprint.”181 The jurist 
urged that the government could not interfere with the 
fundamental right to marry, unless it had compelling interests and 
narrowly tailored bans to safeguard them.182 
Chambers first rejected: (1) the defendant’s motions to 
dismiss, easily finding that plaintiffs had standing by suing the 
clerks, who asserted Burford abstention, which he deemed 
lacking,183 and (2) Baker as a grounds for abstention, because he 
had previously ruled that it was not binding.184 Chambers assessed 
                                                                                                     
applying it to South Carolina’s laws).  
 177. See id. at 526–28, 531 (enjoining the laws as due process and equal 
protection violations and denying plaintiffs’ Full Faith and Credit Clause claim).  
 178. See McGee v. Cole, 66 F. Supp. 3d 747, 750–51 (S.D.W. Va. 2014) (stating 
that the State of West Virginia intervened as a defendant to defend the 
constitutionality of the West Virginia law that excluded same-sex couples from 
marriage). 
 179. See id. at 749 (summarizing challenges to same-sex marriage bans 
following Windsor); supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. 
 180. See McGee, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 749 (discussing the pace of related litigation 
and the court’s decision to stay proceedings). 
 181. Id. 
 182. See id. at 749–50 (concluding that the government did not satisfy the test 
as “governmental restrictions on individual rights must be justified by more than 
simply strongly, or even widely, held opinions or traditions”).  
 183. See id. at 751–56 (rejecting West Virginia’s sovereign immunity defense 
and defendants’ three summary judgment claims). 
 184. See id. at 755 (“In light of the Supreme Court’s apparent abandonment 
of Baker and the significant doctrinal developments that occurred after the Court 
issued its summary dismissal in that case, we decline to view Baker as binding 
precedent.” (quoting Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 375 (4th Cir. 2014))); supra 
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more closely federalism, invoking the Bostic dependence on 
Loving’s admonition that states must exercise authority to 
regulate marriage “without trampling constitutional 
guarantees.”185  
The judge found unavailing the claim that the bars did not 
violate due process or equal protection, given Bostic.186 He 
reviewed the case that held the fundamental right to marry 
demanded strict scrutiny,187 and canvassed the five interests that 
Virginia asserted, which the panel ruled were not compelling or 
narrowly tailored, and its conclusion that state laws violated both 
clauses.188 The jurist said that Bostic controlled and the bans and 
plaintiffs’ claims were the same as in Bostic;189 thus, strict scrutiny 
applied.190 He found that defendant asserted two interests which 
failed: (1) incrementally expanding gay rights to deflect abrupt 
change’s unforeseen results and (2) treating a unique consequence 
of heterosexual intercourse—children’s conception.191 The judge 
said Bostic held that preserving the traditional status quo was not 
compelling and explained that legalizing same-sex marriage would 
not destabilize the institution.192 Potentially working abrupt 
                                                                                                     
note 45 and accompanying text. 
 185. See McGee, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 757 (finding that the principles of 
federalism did not outweigh the court’s duty to determine if the ban violated a 
plaintiff’s constitutional rights (citing Bostic, 760 F.3d at 379)). 
 186. See McGee, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 757–60 (stating that the ban was not 
tailored to achieve the state’s interest).  
 187. See id. at 757–58 (discussing the standard of scrutiny analysis in Bostic 
(citations omitted)).  
 188. See McGee v. Cole, 66 F. Supp. 3d 747, 758 (S.D.W. Va. 2014) (stating 
that the Virginia marriage ban violated the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment (citing Bostic, 760 F.3d at 384)); supra 
notes 81–100 and accompanying text.  
 189. See McGee, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 758 (“The holding in Bostic controls this 
case.”). 
 190. See id. at 759 (acknowledging that the court must assess West Virginia’s 
actual purposes for adopting the marriage ban) (citations omitted).  
 191. See id. at 758 n.5 (rejecting the Sixth Circuit’s reason for favoring bans 
because “wait and see” ignored the courts’ role in the democratic process to protect 
rights and the Sixth Circuit conceded the responsible procreation perspective 
could not be sustained (citing DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 405–06 (6th Cir. 
2014))). 
 192. See McGee, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 759 (concluding that if West Virginia’s 
interest went further, there was not a compelling reason to preserve the laws, as 
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change was irrelevant, because landmark decisions often brought 
this change, and Loving, for example, could have quickly altered 
marriage regulation but the Court invalidated that ban as a 
violation of equal protection.193 Chambers held that limiting the 
“freedom to marry based on sexual orientation violates the Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses”194 and the state experiencing 
change more swiftly than lawmakers anticipated did not compel 
permitting an unconstitutional law to stand.195  
He admitted that defendant might possess a compelling 
interest in fostering heterosexual marriage and stopping “parents 
from abandoning their responsibilities,” yet the ban lacked narrow 
tailoring.196 Virginia claimed a similar interest in Bostic that it 
rejected as “woefully underinclusive”197 and West Virginia bans 
were “equally underinclusive.”198  
B. Supreme Court 
In 2015, the Justices decided the Sixth Circuit appeals in 
Obergefell v. Hodges.199 Kennedy, writing for the majority, first 
                                                                                                     
they violate both due process and equal protection rights). 
 193. See id. (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision to strike down Virginia’s 
anti-miscegenation statute (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6, 12 (1967))). 
 194. McGee, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 759 (citing Bostic v. Schafer, 760 F.3d 352, 384 
(4th Cir. 2014)). 
 195. See id. at 759–60 (explaining that the state had earlier altered its 
marriage policy, so his opinion might not abruptly change present state policy, 
and the asserted interest could not survive strict scrutiny).  
 196. Id. at 760 (rejecting the argument that opposite-sex and same-sex 
couples are not similarly situated because only opposite-sex couples can have an 
unplanned child, resulting in the state’s decision to incentivize marriage for only 
opposite-sex couples). 
 197. See id. (emphasizing that precluding same-sex marriage fails to prevent 
out-of-wedlock births) (citing Bostic, 760 F.3d at 381); supra note 110 and 
accompanying text. 
 198. McGee v. Cole, 66 F. Supp. 3d 747, 760 (S.D.W. Va. 2014) (invalidating 
and enjoining the ban because the laws lack narrow tailoring and fail strict 
scrutiny as they fail to prevent heterosexual “couples from having unwanted 
children” and rearing them poorly).  
 199. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015) (“The petitioners 
in these cases seek to find that liberty by marrying someone of the same sex and 
having their marriages deemed lawful on the same terms and conditions as 
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said that the Constitution promises liberty for all to express and 
define their identity, which plaintiffs sought by “marrying 
someone of the same-sex and having their marriages deemed 
lawful.”200 The annals of history show that marriage has 
transcendent significance, and the institution’s centrality to the 
human condition demonstrates that it has existed for millennia 
across civilizations.201 Marriage’s history reveals continuity and 
change over time,202 while evolving appreciation defines a nation 
in which freedom’s new dimensions become clear to each 
generation, a dynamic that LGBT rights witness.203 Kennedy 
analyzed the United States Supreme Court’s LGBT decisions,204 
the 1993 Hawaii and 2003 Massachusetts Supreme Court 
marriage equality opinions,205 the 1996 DOMA law,206 and its 2013 
partial invalidation in Windsor.207 He observed that several 
appellate courts had treated marriage equality, district courts 
                                                                                                     
marriages between persons of the opposite sex.”). 
 200. Id. at 2593–95 (showing how the petitioners’ situations illuminated their 
cases’ urgency). 
 201. See id. at 2593–94 (presenting references to the importance of marriage 
in the teachings of Confucius and the writings of Cicero) (citations omitted).  
 202. See id. at 2595–96 (observing that developments in the structure of 
marriage have strengthened the institution). 
 203. See id. at 2596 (discussing how LGBT persons recently began leading 
more open lives, provoking discussion and enhanced tolerance, which were 
manifested in litigation over LGBT rights). 
 204. See id. (stating how the Court’s position evolved from upholding laws 
that criminalized certain homosexual acts to holding laws that make same-sex 
intimacy a crime unconstitutional) (first citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 
(1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), then citing Romer v. 
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), then citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575). 
 205. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596 (analyzing prior Hawaii and 
Massachusetts state court opinions regarding same sex marriage) (first citing 
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), abrogated by Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 
2584, then citing Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003)). 
 206. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596 (recognizing the definition of marriage 
contained in DOMA); see also 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012) (“[T]he word ‘marriage’ means 
only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife . . . .”). 
 207. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596–97 (referencing the partial invalidation 
of DOMA in Windsor); supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also United States 
v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770 (2013) (“DOMA’s unusual deviation from the usual 
tradition of recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage here operates 
to deprive same-sex couples of the benefits and responsibilities that come with 
the federal recognition of their marriages.”). 
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published “many thoughtful” opinions,208 and the states remained 
divided after “years of litigation, legislation, referenda and 
discussions.”209  
The Justice mainly relied on due process that safeguards 
fundamental liberties, encompassing most in the Bill of Rights and 
personal choices which are central to individual dignity and 
autonomy.210 He believed that identifying and protecting those 
rights was an enduring aspect of the judicial duty to interpret the 
Constitution 211 while detecting that history and tradition guide 
this endeavor but leave undefined the outer limits of that 
inquiry.212  
Applying these established tenets, Kennedy stated that the 
Justices have perennially held that the Constitution safeguards 
the right to marry.213 He found informative opinions which 
expressed broad constitutional precepts, as they identified the 
marriage right’s critical attributes premised on history and 
tradition and related constitutional liberties inherent in this 
intimate bond.214 The jurist asserted that the Court must honor the 
                                                                                                     
 208. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597 (observing that most district court decisions 
allowed same-sex marriage); see supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. 
 209. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015). 
 210. See id. at 2597–98 (recognizing personal decisions that “define personal 
identity and beliefs” (citations omitted)). 
 211. See id. at 2598 (providing that courts must “exercise reasoned judgment 
in identifying interests of the person so fundamental that the State must accord 
them its respect”). 
 212. See id. (stating that judges can learn from history without allowing it to 
“rule the present”) 
The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent of freedom 
in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future generations a 
charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn 
its meaning. 
Id. 
 213. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598 (“[T]he Court has long held the right to 
marry is protected by the Constitution.”). 
 214. See id. (discussing three modern cases that recognized a fundamental 
right, yet assumed that the parties were opposite-sex partners) (first citing Loving 
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), then citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 
384 (1978), then citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987)); supra notes 88, 
157 and accompanying text. Justice Kennedy recognized that the assumption of 
opposite-sex partners is evident in Baker. See id. (“[Baker held] the exclusion of 
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basic reasons why the right has long enjoyed protection when 
assessing whether its decisions’ rationales and force apply to 
same-sex couples.215 
This analysis drove his conclusion that these “couples may 
exercise the right to marry,” because four principles and traditions 
that show why marriage is deemed fundamental equally apply to 
them.216 First, Kennedy found that the right of personal choice 
regarding marriage is intrinsic to individual autonomy, because 
the decisions were among the most intimate people make.217 He 
said marriage’s nature is that, “through its enduring bond,” two 
persons can discover other freedoms, including spirituality and 
intimacy, which is true for people of any sexual orientation.218 
Second, the marriage right is fundamental, supporting a 
two-person union different from any other in importance to the 
committed people.219 Third, the right affords children and families 
benefits.220 Some are material, yet it offers more profound 
advantages,221 but exclusion violates the right’s integral premise 
by stigmatizing children who deem their families less worthy.222 
Court decisions and traditions identify another precept: “marriage 
                                                                                                     
same-sex couples from marriage did not present a substantial federal question.”). 
 215. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599 (considering how to evaluate 
precedential cases). 
 216. Id. 
 217. See id. (comparing decisions regarding marriage to decisions on 
“contraception, family relationships, procreation and childrearing”). 
 218. Id. 
 219. See id. at 2600 (explaining that “[t]he right to marry thus dignifies 
couples who ‘wish to define themselves by their commitment to each other’” and 
“same-sex couples have the same right as opposite-sex couples to enjoy intimate 
association”) (first quoting United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 763 (2013), 
then citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003)). 
 220. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015) (recognizing that 
the right to marry derives meaning from related rights, including childrearing, 
procreation and education, which the Justices characterize as a unified whole) 
(citations omitted).  
 221. See id. (finding that marriage lends parental relationships recognition 
and legal structure, enabling children “to understand the integrity and closeness 
of their own family and its concord with other families in their community and in 
their daily lives”) (quoting Windsor, 570 U.S. at 772). 
 222. See id. at 2600 (noting that without marriage, families with same-sex 
parents lack the stability, recognition, and predictability that marriage affords).  
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is a keystone” of social order.223 Kennedy perceived no difference, 
yet same-sex couples’ exclusion makes them forfeit the 
“constellation of benefits” which states ascribe to marriage.224  
He said that Glucksberg mandated a narrow definition of 
liberty in the Due Process Clause with “reference to specific 
historical practices,” but that  this conflicted with the fundamental 
rights to marry and intimacy.225 The marriage cases employ the 
right “in its comprehensive sense, asking if there was a sufficient 
justification for excluding the relevant class from the right.”226 
Kennedy deemed the right to marry fundamental as a matter of 
tradition yet found that rights emanate from a better informed 
understanding of “how constitutional imperatives define a 
liberty.”227  
He recognized that many who find same-sex marriage wrong 
premise that on “decent and honorable religious or philosophical” 
bases;228 however, if “sincere, personal opposition becomes enacted 
law and public policy,” this stamps the government imprimatur on 
exclusion which demeans or stigmatizes people whose liberty is 
denied.229 When same-sex couples pursue in marriage the same 
legal treatment as heterosexuals under the Constitution, denial of 
that right “disparage[s] their choices and diminish[es] their 
personhood.”230 
                                                                                                     
 223. See id. at 2601 (examining the growing benefits, rights, and duties that 
states bestow on married couples).  
 224. See id. at 2601–02 (concluding that same-sex couples’ exclusion from 
marriage creates material hurdles and instability, teaches that LGBT people are 
unequal in major respects, and violates the fundamental right to marry while 
inflicting stigma and injury that the Constitution prohibits). 
 225. Id. at 2602 (recognizing that the approach may have been proper for the 
right to physician-assisted suicide asserted in Glucksberg). 
 226. Id. (stating that the Court previously rejected the notion that historical 
practice should be ongoing justification precluding new groups from pursuing 
rights earlier denied, exemplified in the Court’s recognition of new marriage and 
LGBT rights).  
 227. Id. (acknowledging the urgency of recognizing same-sex marriage). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 2602; see also id. at 2607 (stressing that the First Amendment 
protects religion, and adherents to religious doctrines, that continue opposing 
marriage equality). 
 230. Id. at 2602. 
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The jurist argued that equal protection also safeguards the 
right to marry, because this and due process are intimately 
connected, despite being separate tenets.231 In particular 
situations, each clause may rest on different concepts and identify 
the right’s essence more accurately, even while both converge to 
pinpoint and define the right.232 That dynamic applies to same-sex 
marriage, as the laws burden the liberty of couples while infringing 
on equality’s core precepts, deny them all benefits that 
opposite-sex couples have, and preclude the exercise of a 
fundamental right.233  
These factors prompted the conclusions that the “right to 
marry is a fundamental right inherent in” liberty, and under due 
process and equal protection same-sex couples “may not be 
deprived of that right and that liberty.”234 The Court held that 
couples possess this right, overruled Baker and invalidated state 
laws which excluded same-sex couples from marriage.235 
Kennedy responded to the concern that judges should proceed 
cautiously and wait on more “legislation, litigation, and debate.”236 
He said that the Constitution envisions democracy as the 
appropriate process for change when it does not violate 
fundamental rights, conceding that the Schuette plurality affirmed 
                                                                                                     
 231. See id. at 2602–03 (“Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal 
protection may rest on different precepts and are not always co-extensive, yet in 
some instances each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the 
other.”). 
 232. See id. at 2603 (recognizing that the “interrelation of the two principles 
furthers our understanding of what freedom is and must become”). Court opinions 
on the right to marry, invidious sex-based marriage classifications, and LGBT 
rights reflect this dynamic. See id. at 2603–04 (analyzing the confluence of the 
Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause in prior case law) (citations 
omitted).  
 233. See id. at 2604 (concluding that equal protection and due process bar the 
unwarranted abridgment of the fundamental right to marry, which disrespects 
and subordinates LGBT people). 
 234. Id. 
 235. See id. at 2605 (holding the state laws invalid “to the extent they exclude 
same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as 
opposite-sex couples”). 
 236. Id. at 2065. Kennedy disagreed with the Sixth Circuit’s concern that 
“respondents’ States [should] await further public discussion and political 
measures before licensing same-sex marriages,” stating that “substantial 
attention” had already been devoted to the question. Id. 
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the significance of this concept and constitutional freedom, which 
secures a person’s right to suffer no injury from unlawful 
governmental action.237 Notwithstanding democracy’s more 
general value, the Constitution demands judicial redress when the 
government contravenes individual rights.238 Thus, people who 
allegedly suffer harm can vindicate in court a personal stake in the 
Constitution, even if the broader citizenry differs and the 
legislature rejects action, because the document withdrew certain 
matters from politics.239 
C. Marriage Equality’s Implementation 
Marriage equality’s implementation proceeded smoothly. 
Maryland felicitously initiated equality because its Assembly 
passed a statute which the people approved in a referendum.240 
                                                                                                     
 237. Id.  
 238. See id. (“This holds true even when protecting individual rights affects 
issues of the utmost importance and sensitivity.”). 
 239. See id. at 2605–06 (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624, 638, (1943)); supra note 159. The Constitution places “fundamental rights 
[which] may not be submitted to a vote” beyond majorities’ reach, which makes 
them legal tenets that courts apply. Id.  
 240. See Civil Marriage Protection Act, H.B. 438, 2012 Sess. (Md. 2012) 
(allowing gay and lesbian couples to obtain civil marriage licenses); Statewide 
Ballot Question Language, MD. ST. BD. OF ELECTIONS (Aug. 20, 2012), 
https://elections.maryland.gov/elections/2012/ballot_question_language.html#sta
te6 (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (including the ballot language of the “Maryland 
same-sex marriage referendum” on House Bill 438, also known as “Question 6”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also supra notes 178–79 
(describing why the nationwide implementation of marriage equality after 
Windsor was relatively smooth); Md. Approves Gay Marriage In Historic ‘Question 
6’ Vote, HUFFINGTON POST, 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/07/maryland-question-6-results-
2012_n_2050830.html (last updated Feb. 2, 2016) (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) 
(reporting that “Question 6” was approved by 52% of Maryland voters) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Kevin Rector, Md. Attorney General 
Says Supreme Court Must Overturn Same-Sex Marriage Bans Nationwide, BALT. 
SUN (Mar. 9, 2015, 4:00 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/features/gay-in-
maryland/gay-matters/bs-gm-attorney-general-issues-report-calling-samesex-
marriage-bans-20150309-story.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (describing the 
Maryland Attorney General’s favorable opinion on marriage equality and 
detailing the prior efforts of Maryland and other states to enact marriage equality 
legislation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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Thus, equality had widespread popular support; state and local 
officers ensured efficacious institution and had considerable time 
to plan.241 For example, Democratic Attorney General Brian Frosh 
crafted a thorough substantive opinion which foresaw potential 
difficulties, carefully answered numbers of questions that could 
arise, and tendered helpful recommendations for swift 
implementation.242 The other jurisdictions commenced institution 
expeditiously following the Bostic appeal’s denial243 and 
implemented equality rather well. 
Democratic Governor Terry McAuliffe, Attorney General 
Herring, and numerous other Virginia state and local officials 
quickly acted to fully effectuate Bostic’s mandate. The Governor 
issued an executive order instructing state workers to accord 
same-sex married couples each benefit across a number of critical 
areas—including health care, taxation and adoption—that 
heterosexuals possess.244 Clerk offices also seemed to issue licenses 
well, because quite a few made concerted efforts to comply.245 
                                                                                                     
 241. Maryland’s Civil Marriage Protection Act was passed in February 2012, 
signed in March, approved by voters in a November referendum, and became 
effective January 1, 2013. See supra note 239. 
 242. See Issuance of Marriage Licenses to Same-Sex Couples After Approval 
of the Civil Marriage Protection Act, 97 Md. Att’y Gen. Op. 72 (2012) (answering 
questions from clerks regarding the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex 
couples). 
 243. See supra note 135 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 248–258 
and accompanying text.  
 244. See Va. Exec. Order No. 30 (2014) (ordering state agencies to “take all 
necessary and appropriate legal measures to comply with” Bostic). “On issues 
ranging from recognizing same-sex marriages to extending health care benefits 
to same-sex spouses of state employees, state government is already 
well-prepared to implement this landmark decision.” Id.; see also Va. Exec. Order 
No. 61 (2017) (“Virginia will not do business with entities that discriminate based 
on sexual orientation or gender identity.”); Statement of Att’y Gen. Herring on 
Marriage Equality in Va. (Oct. 6, 2014) (reporting that local clerks would begin 
issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples); Va. Dep’t of Tax’n, Tax Bull. 14-7 
(Oct. 7, 2014) (declaring that same-sex marriages recognized for federal income 
tax purposes would also be recognized for Virginia income tax purposes); Bull. 
from Margaret Schultze, Comm’r Va. Soc. Servs. Dep’t, to Local Soc. Servs. Dep’ts 
on Bostic’s Impact (Oct. 10, 2014) (announcing that married same-sex couples 
could now adopt children and serve as foster parents). 
 245. The seven-month window between Bostic’s appeal and Supreme Court 
denial of certiorari provided government agencies and clerk offices much time to 
plan for the influx of Virginians seeking marriage licenses. See John Woodrow 
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However, numerous GOP legislators preferred to wait on 
Obergefell’s final disposition before revising marriage laws.246 
Virginia senators and delegates have introduced bills that would 
repeal the same-sex marriage ban, but the Assembly has not 
acted.247 
North Carolina instituted marriage equality relatively 
smoothly after the Fourth Circuit denied the Bostic appeal. 
Numbers of state magistrates expressed religious objections to 
conducting same-sex marriages, and plentiful deeds registers 
voiced similar concerns about issuing licenses.248 The Assembly 
                                                                                                     
Cox, Jenna Portnoy & Justin Jouvenal, Same-Sex Couples Begin to Marry in 
Virginia, WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/same-sex-marriages-in-
virginia-can-begin-almost-immediately/2014/10/06/97ceab2e-4d69-11e4-aa5e-
7153e466a02d_story.html?utm_term=.9e25cc7e57b3 (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) 
(describing same-sex couples who sought marriage licenses the day that the 
Justices denied the  Bostic appeal) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Jim Nolan, McAuliffe Orders Agencies to Comply with Same-Sex 
Marriage, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Oct. 7, 2014), 
https://www.richmond.com/news/virginia/mcauliffe-orders-agencies-to-comply-
with-same-sex-marriage/article_aad77b10-8b14-5d14-807b-0b36344c6791.html 
(last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (describing the reaction to Executive Order 30) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Governor McAuliffe vetoed a 
“religious freedom” bill exempting religious organizations and ministers from 
performing same-sex marriages, which passed the Virginia House and Senate. 
S.B. 41, 2016 Sess. (Va. 2016). 
 246. See Markus Schmidt, After Gay Marriage Ruling, State Law Requires 
Update, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (June 28, 2015), 
https://www.richmond.com/news/virginia/government-politics/after-gay-
marriageruling-state-law-requires-update/article_60990341-dfa6-5119-a267-0893 
05ab6348. html (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (“Republican state legislators remained 
wary of adopting regulatory changes ahead of a final Supreme Court ruling on 
gay marriage, blocking attempts by Democrats to update the code.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 247. See H.B. 414, 2018 Sess. (Va. 2018) (proposing the repeal of statutory 
prohibitions on same-sex marriage in light of Obergefell); S.B. 603, 2018 Sess. (Va. 
2018) (proposing the implementation of gender-neutral terms in Virginia 
marriage statutes, e.g. “widow” becomes “surviving spouse”). 
 248. See Beth Walton, W.N.C. Magistrate Resigns, Objects to Same-Sex 
Marriage, CITIZEN TIMES, https://www.citizen-times.com/story/news/local/ 
2014/10/21/wnc-magistrate-resigns-objects-sex-marriage/17658901/ (last 
updated Sept. 21, 2015, 10:22 PM) (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (reporting the 
resignation of several North Carolina magistrates) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); see also Colin Campbell, N.C. Senate’s Move to Exempt 
Magistrates Rekindles Gay Marriage Debate, NEWS & OBSERVER, 
https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article11 
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passed a 2015 bill giving the officers the “right to recuse from 
performing all lawful marriages” and issuing every lawful license 
based on “any sincerely held religious objection.”249 Republican 
Governor Pat McCrory vetoed the measure, because “no public 
official who voluntarily swears to support and defend the 
Constitution . . . should be exempt from upholding that oath,”250 
yet the bill became law.251 Equality proponents contested this, but 
                                                                                                     
312021.html (last updated Feb. 25, 2015, 9:07 PM) (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) 
(emphasizing the political turmoil over the religious exemption for magistrates 
and deeds employees) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). But see 
Beth Walton, Officials to Issue Marriage Licenses Regardless of Beliefs, CITIZEN 
TIMES, https://www.citizen-times.com/story/news/local/2014/10/20/officials-issue-
licenses-regardless-beliefs/17635563/ (last updated Oct. 21, 2014, 11:49 AM) (last 
visited Dec. 5, 2018) (maintaining that clerks in the Asheville deeds office upheld 
the law in spite of their religious objection to same-sex marriage) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 249. S.B. 2, Sess. L. 2015-75 (N.C. 2015). See Garrett Epps, N.C.’s Rightward 
Turn, ATLANTIC (June 9, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/north-carolina-same-sex-
marriage/395171/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (citing the recusal law as an indication 
of a broader trend towards conservatism in North Carolina) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Jonathan Katz, N.C. Officials Can Now Cite 
Religion as Basis to Refuse Marriage Duties, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2015, at A14 
(observing that the bill “allows magistrates, along with assistant and deputy 
registers of deeds, to refuse to perform a marriage without facing punishment or 
charges of willfully failing to discharge their duties”). 
 250. Gov. Pat McCrory S.B. 2 Veto Statement, May 28, 2015. 
 251. N.C. CODE §§ 7A-292(b), 51-5.5, 114-230(b), 161-27(b) (2015); see Colin 
Campbell, McCrory Will Veto Bill Letting Magistrates Opt Out of Performing Gay 
Marriages, NEWS & OBSERVER, https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-
government/article22513470.html (last updated May 29, 2015, 11:02 AM) (last 
visited Dec. 5, 2018) (describing the governor’s plan to veto S.B. 2) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Craig Jarvis & Colin Campbell, N.C. 
House Overrides Governor’s Veto on Marriage Bill, Making it Law, NEWS & 
OBSERVER, https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-
government/article23746558.html (last visited June 11, 2015 7:21 PM) (last 
visited Dec. 5, 2018) (“The Senate overrode the veto by a wide margin[, but] the 
votes in the House were much closer.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); see also Noah Feldman, What the Oath of Office Means to a Kentucky 
Clerk, BLOOMBERGVIEW (Sept. 3, 2015, 10:43 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-09-03/what-oath-of-office-means-
to-county-clerk-kim-davis (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (describing a Kentucky clerk 
who refused to administer marriage licenses because “obedience to the moral law 
of God” is part of upholding “one’s constitutional duties and obligations” as a 
government employee) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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Judge Cogburn ruled that they lacked standing.252 Same-sex 
couples have apparently experienced little difficulty securing 
licenses or weddings, because few officers seemed to recuse; and 
when all in a locality have, the measure provided for that 
contingency.253 
South Carolina appeared to implement marriage equality 
comparatively smoothly after Judges Gergel and Childs held its 
bans unconstitutional.254 However, Republican Attorney General 
Alan Wilson appealed speedily (albeit fruitlessly) once the cases 
were decided, but after the U.S. Supreme Court Justices resolved 
                                                                                                     
    252. Ansley v. Warren, No. 116CV00054MOCDLH, 2016 WL5213937, at *9–
16 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 20, 2016), aff’d, 861 F.3d 512 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 253. See N.C. CODE § 51-5.5(b)–(c) (2015) (providing a contingent plan to bring 
in officers from other areas if all officers in one district refuse to perform their 
duties); Colin Campbell, 32 N.C. Magistrates Opt Out of Marriages, Won’t Face 
Penalties, NEWS & OBSERVER, https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-
government/state-politics/article33815355.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2015, 3:59 
PM) (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (reporting less than 5% of the state’s 
magistrates— only 32 of 670—recused themselves after the law passed in 2015) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); infra notes 280–282. A special 
2016 session passed H.B. 2, a law eliminating local anti-discrimination 
protections for LGBT people and requiring individuals to use restrooms and 
facilities that corresponded to the sex on their birth certificates. The portion of 
H.B. 2 regarding bathroom use was challenged and repealed, causing more 
controversy by halting local action through 2020. H.B. 2, Sess. L. 2016-3 (N.C. 
2016) (bathroom ban); Carcaño v. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 615 (M.D.N.C. 2016) 
(challenging H.B. 2 and seeking a preliminary injunction, which the court granted 
for individual transgender plaintiffs under Title IX but denied for their equal 
protection claim and reserved on their due process claims); H.B. 142, Sess. L. 
2017-4 (N.C. 2017) (repealing and replacing H.B. 2); see Richard Fausset, 
Bathroom Law Repeal Leaves Few Pleased in N.C., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2017, at 
A1; Motoko Rich, N.C. Law Barring Anti-Discrimination Measures Draws Sharp 
Backlash, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2016, at A13.  
 254. See supra notes 149–177 and accompanying text; see, e.g., S.C. Dep’t of 
Revenue, South Carolina Tax Treatment of Same-Sex Marriages (Property Taxes 
and Deed Recording Fees), S.C. Rev. Rul. #14-9 (2014) (modifying the tax code to 
recognize same-sex marriages for income tax purposes); S.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 
South Carolina Income Tax Treatment of Same-Sex Marriages (Income Tax), S.C. 
Rev. Rul. #14-8 (2014) (same); see also Kurtis Lee, Same-Sex Marriage Licenses 
Doled Out in S.C., L.A. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2014, 2:04 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-supreme-court-deny-stay-
same-sex-marriage-south-carolina-20141120-story.html# (last visited Dec. 5, 
2018) (“From Columbia to Charleston, couples lined up at probate courts to obtain 
the licenses, sharing photos on social media and calling for marriage equality in 
all 50 states.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
MARRIAGE EQUALITY 2045 
Obergefell Wilson filed motions to voluntarily dismiss them, which 
the circuit granted.255 
West Virginia initiated equality rapidly following the Bostic 
appeal’s denial.256 Republican Attorney General Patrick Morrisey 
ended its case, as Bostic was binding; Democratic Governor Earl 
Ray Tomblin carefully ordered state agencies to obey Bostic and 
county clerks to quickly provide same-sex couples marriage 
licenses.257 Clerks’ first responses were unclear, yet a number 
gradually issued licenses, particularly after Judge Chambers 
issued his ruling.258 One blatant 2016 exception was a staffer who 
                                                                                                     
 255. See Condon v. Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572 (D.S.C. Nov. 12, 2014), stay 
pending appeal denied 14-2241 (4th Cir. Nov. 18, 2014), appeal dismissed 14-2241  
(4th Circ. Jul 20, 2015); Bradacs v. Haley, 58 F. Supp. 3d 514 (D.S.C. Nov. 18, 
2014), appeal dismissed 14-2337 (4th Cir. July 20, 2015). The Senate considered 
an exemption bill like North Carolina’s law. S.B. 116, 121st Sess. (S.C. 2016). 
 256.  It did not await McGee’s November issuance. See supra notes 177–197 
and accompanying text. 
 257. See James Queally, West Virginia to Stop Challenging Same-Sex 
Marriage, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2014, 12:36 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-west-virginia-same-sex-
marriage-20141009-story.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (quoting Morrisey as 
stating “[w]hile we disagree with the Supreme Court’s decision to allow the 4th 
Circuit’s opinion to stand and believe it improperly displaces state and local 
decision-making, we will respect it”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Press Release, Governor Tomblin Issues Statement on Same-Sex 
Marriage (Oct. 14, 2014), 
http://www.governor.wv.gov/media/pressreleases/2014/pages/governor-tomblin-
issues-statement-regardingsame-sex-marriage-in-west-virginia.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/5X5H-PMEB] (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (“West Virginia will 
uphold the law according to these rulings, and I have directed state agencies to 
take appropriate action to make that possible.”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 258. See Erin Beck, W. Va. Drops Gay Marriage Ban, W. VA. GAZETTE (Oct. 9, 
2014), https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/west-virginia-drops-gay-marriage-
ban/article_411169b0-17ae-58b8-b0de-5294daddf552.html (last visited Dec. 5, 
2018) (“While Kanawha and Cabell counties . . . issued same-sex marriage 
licenses without a hitch, Putnam County Clerk Brian Wood said he would not 
issue any licenses until Friday, after he’d talked with county Prosecuting 
Attorney Mark Sorsaia.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). See 
also W. Va. Tax Dep’t, W. Va. Tax-Same-Sex Marriage, Admin. Notice 2014-20 
(Oct. 20, 2014), 
http://www.state.wv.us/taxrev/publications/administrativeNotices/2014/Adminis
trativeNotice.2014-20.pdf (notifying taxpayers that taxes “filed by lawfully 
married individuals will be processed without regard to the gender . . . of the 
married partners”). The House passed a RFRA that the Senate rejected in 2016. 
H.B. 4012 (W. Va. 2016). In 2017, the Senate assessed a similar bill. S.B. 19 (W. 
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mistreated one couple seeking a license, which prompted their 
victorious federal litigation.259 
In sum, the Fourth Circuit upheld Judge Wright Allen’s 
opinion regarding marriage equality. Denial of Bostic’s review 
ushered in equality throughout the Fourth Circuit.260  
IV. Lessons from Marriage Equality Initiatives 
Only Maryland lawmakers and voters implemented marriage 
equality. In the other states, equality advocates convinced jurists 
that the Fourteenth Amendment granted: (1) same-sex couples a 
fundamental right to marry, and (2) courts power to invalidate 
violative laws.261 This suggests that the public supported equality 
less there, which might impede effectuation.262 Legislation, such as 
the North Carolina bathroom ban, which mandated that 
individuals use the restroom that corresponded with the gender 
                                                                                                     
Va. 2017). 
 259. See Brookover v. Gilmer Cty., No. 1:2017-CV-00057 (N.D. W. Va. 2017) 
(ruling in favor of the lesbian couple); Rachel Chason, Lesbians Win $10,000 
Judgment Against County Clerk for Calling Them an ‘Abomination’, WASH. POST 
(Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2017/08/31/lesbians-win-10000-judgment-against-county-clerk-for-
calling-them-an-abomination/?utm_term=.a28a491dc93c (last visited Dec. 5, 
2018) (“[The] Deputy Clerk . . . slammed the paperwork on the desk, . . . called 
the couple an ‘abomination’ in a rant that continued for several 
minutes[,] . . . . [and] shout[ed] that it was [her] ‘religious right’ to harass the 
couple.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 260. Marriage equality effectively came because district judges of three states 
ruled that Bostic bound them. See supra notes 136–197 and accompanying text 
(district judges, ruling in three states that Bostic bound them).   
 261. These advocates contended that the Fourteenth Amendment trumped 
the powerful state interests reflected in marriage bans. See United States v. 
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice against discrete and 
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the 
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect 
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial 
inquiry.”); supra notes 82–86, 144 and accompanying text. 
 262. But see Andrew Flores, Trends in Public Support for Same-Sex Marriage, 
WILLIAMS INST. (Apr. 2015), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-
content/uploads/Trends-in-Public-Support-for-Same-Sex-Marriage-2004-
2014.pdf (demonstrating though a comprehensive statistical study that “support 
for same-sex marriage has increased at a rapid pace in every state in the past 
decade”). 
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listed on their birth certificate, may suggest potential lack of public 
support for LGBT people generally.263 Numerous Trump 
Administration initiatives might concomitantly have undermined 
this public support. For example, the Trump Justice Department 
refused to continue pursuing federal litigation which the Obama 
Justice Department originally filed challenging the state’s 
bathroom law.264 Officials claimed that they were dropping the suit 
because the legislature had repealed the bathroom law, but LGBT 
individuals and groups strongly criticized this idea because they 
believed the repeal was worse than the original law.265  
The DOJ and the Department of Education have similarly 
rescinded Obama Administration guidance on bathroom use in 
public secondary schools which prescribed current gender identity 
as the touchstone, because the departments claimed that it lacked 
legal justification.266 This aligned with the plaintiffs who 
                                                                                                     
 263. See H.B. 2, 2d Extra Sess. 2016 (N.C. 2016) (nullifying all local LGBT 
nondiscrimination ordinances). But see H.B. 142, 2017 Sess. (N.C. 2017) 
(repealing and replacing the “bathroom ban”); Mark Joseph Stern, The HB2 
“Repeal” Bill is an Unmitigated Disaster for LGBTQ Rights and North Carolina, 
SLATE (Mar. 30, 2017, 12:25 PM), https://slate.com/human-interest/2017/03/hb2-
repeal-bill-is-a-disaster-for-north-carolina-and-lgbtq-rights.html (last visited 
Dec. 5, 2018) (criticizing the repeal as “an unmitigated disaster for LGBTQ rights” 
because it “forbids ‘state agencies, boards, offices, departments, institutions,’ and 
‘branches of government,’ including public universities, from regulating ‘access to 
multiple occupancy restrooms, showers, or changing facilities’”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 264. Mark Berman, Justice Dept. Drops Federal Lawsuit over North 
Carolina’s ‘Bathroom Bill’, WASH. POST (Apr. 14, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/04/14/justice-dept-
drops-federal-lawsuit-over-north-carolinas-bathroom-
bill/?utm_term=.1b43b194c4ea (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (contrasting the Obama 
and Trump Administrations’ positions on the “bathroom ban” litigation) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 265. Id. 
 266. See Sandra Battle, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of 
Educ., & T.E. Wheeler, II, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen. for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t 
of Just., Dear Colleague Letter on Transgender Students, Feb. 22, 2017, 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201702-title-ix.pdf 
(withdrawing an Obama-era guideline that Title IX requires access to 
sex-segregated facilities based on gender identity because the previous 
administration misinterpreted the civil rights law); see also Libby Bulinski, 
“Transgender Need Not Apply:” How the Sessions Memo Threatens Essential 
Workplace Protections For Transgender Individuals, 102 MINN. L. REV. DE NOVO 
(Nov. 12, 2017), http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/ 2017/11/transgender-need-
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challenged the earlier guidelines 267 and the defendant school 
board in Grimm.268 The Trump Administration has analogously 
undermined Obama Administration efforts to support military 
service by transgender individuals, although numerous courts 
have rejected the government’s efforts.269  
                                                                                                     
not-apply (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (asserting that Sessions’ reversal of workplace 
protections instituted by former Attorney General Eric Holder “limits Title VII’s 
prohibition on sex discrimination by excluding discrimination based on gender 
identity”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Sari Horwitz  & 
Spencer S. Hsu, Sessions Ends Workplace Protections for Transgender People 
Under Civil Rights Act, WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2017), 
http://wapo.st/2xY4yxt?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.3611b3a71eae (last visited Dec. 5, 
2018) (reporting Sessions’ revocation of policies that protected transgender 
workers from discrimination under federal law) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 267. See Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810, 815–16 (N.D. Tex. 2016). 
Plaintiffs in Texas consisted of thirteen states and agencies who sued the 
Departments of Education, Justice, Labor, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, and various agency officials, challenging Defendants’ assertions 
that “Title VII and Title IX require that all persons must be afforded the 
opportunity to have access to restrooms, locker rooms, showers, and other 
intimate facilities which match their gender identity rather than their biological 
sex.” Id.; see also Liam Stack, Trump Drops Defense of Obama Guidelines on 
Transgender Students, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2017, at A15 (describing the Trump 
administration as “ready to discard its obligation to protect all students”).  
 268. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F. 3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding 
that the Obama-era regulation was entitled to deference), dismissed as moot, 137 
S. Ct. 1239 (mem.) (2017). The transgender plaintiff in Grimm sued the board of 
his high school for violating the Obama-era Title IX regulation after it passed a 
policy banning him from the men’s restroom. Id.; see also Stack, supra note 267 
(discussing Grimm). DOJ also altered its position in the N.C. H.B. 2 case; supra 
note 264.   
 269. See Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 217 (D.D.C. 2017) (granting a 
preliminary injunction against the ban on transgender individuals in the 
military); Stone v. Trump, 280 F. Supp. 3d 747, 770 (D. Md. 2017) (granting a 
preliminary injunction and blocking the administration’s prohibition on gender 
reassignment surgery for military service members), appeal dismissed, No. 
17-2398, 2018 WL 2717050 (4th Cir. Feb. 2, 2018); see also Memorandum on 
Military Service by Transgender Individuals, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. (Aug. 
25, 2017) (preventing the accession of transgender individuals into military 
service and halting the use of DOD and DHS funds for sex-reassignment surgery); 
Helene Cooper, Judge Lifts Transgender Restrictions In Military, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
11, 2017, at A16 (discussing the DOJ’s reinstatement of Obama-era transgender 
military policies in response to the “barrage of lawsuits” following issuance of 
Trump’s memorandum).   
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Fourth Circuit states’ initiation of equality yielded pragmatic 
and symbolic impacts. A crucial practical effect is that thousands 
of same-sex couples and their families, notably the children whom 
the parents rear, experience less stigma, prejudice and humiliation 
and realize plentiful benefits which marriage offers.270 Tangible 
advantages include economic gains and security, namely 
marriage’s impacts on health care, taxation, and adoption of 
children. Less tangible are respect, legitimacy, emotional and 
psychological support, companionship, and recognition.271  
Activities of legislative and executive branch officials and local 
government workers, notably clerks, influenced equality’s positive 
reception once the Justices denied appeals. For instance, 
constructive efforts by Virginia and West Virginia Governors, 
Attorneys General and local officers to smoothly institute equality 
provided same-sex couples and their children many benefits, 
namely increased respect, decreased prejudice, and greater 
financial security.272 The endeavors also promoted meaningful 
social change after the Court had recognized equality without the 
divisiveness, resistance and controversy attending 
implementation elsewhere.273  
                                                                                                     
 270. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 658 (7th Cir. 2014). Although marriage 
equality will not immediately change the negative views that many Americans 
hold of gay couples, the legitimization of same-sex marriage “may convert some 
of [its] opponents . . . by demonstrating that homosexual married couples are in 
essential respects, notably in the care of their adopted children, like other married 
couples.” Id. 
 271. See Autumn L. Bernhardt, The Profound and Intimate Power of the 
Obergefell Decision: Equal Dignity as a Suspect Class, 25 TUL. J. L. & SEXUALITY 
1 (2016) (celebrating Obergefell’s role in “relieving gay Americans and their 
families from the material costs, insecurity, and stigma of second class 
citizenship”); Suzanne Goldberg, Reflections on Obergefell and the 
Family-Recognition Framework’s Continuing Value, 84 UMKC L. REV. 707, 709 
(2016) (“[E]qual access to [marriage] for same-sex couples has propelled increased 
acceptance of gay people into the fabric of American society.”).  
 272. See cases cited supra notes 245, 257 and accompanying text. As a result 
of these efforts, same-sex couples and their children were welcomed as fuller 
community participants. 
 273. Alabama, Kentucky, and Texas experienced notable controversy 
following the Court’s recognition of marriage equality. See sources cited infra 
notes 312, 314. North and South Carolina officials continued resisting Bostic’s 
mandate after certiorari’s denial by pursuing fruitless appeals that wasted 
resources, perhaps fueling division. See discussion supra notes 136–176 and 
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The marriage equality initiatives also proffered critical 
symbolic effects. The Fourth Circuit jurisdictions have been 
defendants in many pathbreaking social policy cases since the 
1940s. Illustrative was litigation pursued to end segregated public 
facilities,274 voting strictures275 and interracial marriage bans.276 
The precedents’ citation by Judges Floyd and Wright Allen and 
other district courts showed their appreciation of equality’s 
compelling symbolic value.277 
Insofar as equality proponents relied on a national litigation 
strategy, the prior analysis suggests that the Fourth Circuit was 
important to this effort. A Pew Research Center study on attitudes 
of people on same-sex marriage across the country indicates that 
the South Central region (AL, AR, KY, LA, MS, OK, TN, TX) 
appears less hospitable to equality than other regions; perhaps 
that is why equality proponents may have viewed the Upper South 
(which includes the Fourth Circuit) as comparatively open to 
                                                                                                     
accompanying text. 
 274. South Carolina and Virginia suits served as companion cases to Brown 
v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Other cases addressed gender segregation in 
higher education and racial segregation in public accommodations. See, e.g., U.S. 
v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (requiring VMI, a Virginia military college, to 
admit women in accordance with the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause); 
Maryland v. Bell, 378 U.S. 226 (1964) (remanding without assessing the merits 
of whether private actions of segregation enforced by state courts constituted a 
state action which violated the Equal Protection Clause). See generally RICHARD 
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976).  
 275. See Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (banning 
the discriminatory use of poll taxes in state elections under the Equal Protection 
Clause); see also David Schultz & Sarah Clark, Wealth v. Democracy: The 
Unfulfilled Promise of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 375 
(2011) (discussing the minimal impact of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment on 
American law, notably in comparison with Supreme Court precedents such as 
Harper that struck down poll taxes). 
 276. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that miscegenation 
statutes adopted by Virginia to prevent marriages between persons solely on the 
basis of racial classification violate Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of 
Fourteenth Amendment); see Christopher Leslie, Embracing Loving: 
Trait-Specific Marriage Laws and Heightened Scrutiny, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1077 
(2014). “[F]ollowing the logic of Loving, same-sex marriage bans necessarily 
classify based on gender and, thus, gender-specific marriage laws should receive 
heightened scrutiny” and same-sex marriage bans should be held 
unconstitutional. Id. at 1077–78; see also supra notes 31, 77.  
 277. See, e.g., supra notes 31, 77, 142 and accompanying text.  
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equality’s improvement.278 For example, Virginia is the 
northernmost southern jurisdiction, rather centrist politically and 
within the moderate Fourth Circuit and was the defendant in 
numerous landmark suits.279 The concepts explicate why Bostic 
was an initial post-Windsor marriage equality case, which ended 
before additional Fourth Circuit district litigation, and was 
integral to the national equality initiatives and why Virginia was 
the first southern state where a court recognized equality.  
                                                                                                     
 278. The Northeast and West Coast appeared receptive. Same-Sex Marriage 
Detailed Tables, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 8, 2015), http://www.people-
press.org/2015/06/08/same-sex-marriage-detailed-tables/ (last visited Dec. 5, 
2018) (showing South Central region as having a 54% net opposition to same-sex 
marriage, but Middle Atlantic (including MD) and the South Atlantic (including 
NC, SC, VA, and WV) having an average of 36.5% net opposition) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 279. See supra notes 274–275. Virginia is the only southern state that Hillary 
Clinton won. See also Micah Cohen, In Virginia, It’s Tradition Versus Change, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2012), 
https://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/04/in-virginia-its-tradition-
versus-change/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (observing that Virginia has been 
considered a politically centrist battleground state since the 2008 election, when 
Obama became the first Democrat to carry Virginia since 1964 due to the state’s 
shifting political climate, increasing urbanization, and changing demographics) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Reid Wilson et al., How the 
New South Became a Swing Region, HILL (Aug. 13, 2017, 7:31 AM), 
http://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/346270-how-the-new-south-became-a-
swing-region (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (declaring that Virginia and North 
Carolina, both Fourth Circuit states, are now the “New South” where changing 
demographics in formerly conservative districts have resulted in more liberal 
election outcomes in recent years) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Ann Marinow, There’s a Word That No Longer Describes the Federal 




visited Dec. 5, 2018) (“The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, a 
Richmond-based venue the [Trump] administration might once have found 
reliably hospitable, now has a higher proportion of judges tapped by Democrats 
than most of the nation’s 13 circuit courts.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review); Carl Tobias, After Ruling on Trump’s Travel Ban, All Eyes Are on 
4th Circuit, WASH. POST (June 2, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/after-a-ruling-on-trumps-travel-ban-
all-eyes-are-on-the-4th-circuit/2017/06/02/b7a555f2-4545-11e7-bcde-
624ad94170ab_story.html?utm_term=.3dc96339f013 (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) 
(discussing the Fourth Circuit’s transition from ideologically conservative to 
moderate) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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Observers ascribed marriage equality to certain “activist 
judges,”280 but this lacks persuasiveness. Those invalidating bans 
nationally resemble Fourth Circuit appellate and district jurists, 
who ruled that bars lacked constitutionality.281 Across the United 
States, more judges appointed by Democratic than Republican 
Presidents rejected bans, and President Barack Obama tapped 
some, especially in the Fourth Circuit.282 However, notable GOP 
appointees who struck down bars were Circuit Judge Richard 
Posner and District Judges Bernard Friedman, John Heyburn and 
John Jones.283 President George W. Bush confirmed Judges Floyd 
                                                                                                     
 280. See Ryan Anderson, Judicial Activism From the Court on Marriage: 
Here’s How to Respond, NAT’L REV. (June 26, 2015, 9:00 PM), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2015/06/gay-marriage-decision-conservative-
response-ryan-t-anderson/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (insisting that it was 
inappropriate for the Court to mandate marriage equality in all fifty states) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Greg Hitt & Jacob M. Schlesinger, 
Bush Supports Constitutional Ban on Gay Marriage, WALL STREET J., 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB107763526982637731 (last updated Feb. 25, 
2004, 1:21 PM) (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (describing President George W. Bush’s 
support for a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage in order to 
prevent the issue from reaching “activist judges”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 281. Robert Barnes, From a Diverse Group of Judges, a Unanimous Opinion 
on Same-Sex Marriage, WASH. POST, May 26, 2014, at A1 (“[T]he federal judges 
who have supplied an unbroken wave of victories across the country to supporters 
of same-sex marriage are more diverse than their rulings would suggest: white 
and black, gay and straight, nominated by Democrats (most of them) and chosen 
by Republicans (a few of them).”); see also AFJ, supra note 10 (describing the 
demographics of the federal judges ruling on marriage equality). 
 282. See, e.g., Bradacs v. Haley, 58 F. Supp. 3d 514, 520 (D.S.C. 2014) (Judge 
Childs) (holding same-sex marriage bans violated due process and equal 
protection); Gen. Synod of the United Church of Christ v. Resinger, 12 F. Supp. 
3d 790 (W.D.N.C. 2014) (Judge Cogburn) (same); Condon v. Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 
572 (D.S.C. 2014) (Judge Gergel) (same).  
 283. See DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (Judge 
Friedman); Love v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536 (W.D. Ky. 2014) (Judge 
Heyburn); Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (Judge Jones); 
Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Richard A. 
Posner, Eighteen Years On: A Re-Review—The Case for Same-Sex Marriage: From 
Sexual Liberty to Civilized Commitment, 125 YALE L.J. 533, 541 (2015) 
(explaining his reason for altering his opinion on same-sex marriage bans); Adam 
Liptak, An Exit Interview with a Judicial Firebrawl, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2017, 
at A18 (describing Posner’s shifting ideology). 
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and Osteen to districts and Judge Gregory to the court of 
appeals.284  
In sum, concerted endeavors by many national, state, and local 
entities; government officials; and citizens individually and 
synergistically brought marriage equality to the Fourth Circuit. 
Most jurisdictions and localities within the court and the United 
States have appeared receptive to equality, yet others have not. 
Thus, the last Part tenders future suggestions. 
V. Suggestions for the Future 
A. Fourth Circuit States 
The Fourth Circuit jurisdictions need to fully institute 
Obergefell’s mandate by ensuring identical treatment between 
same-sex and heterosexual couples and their families. State and 
local officers—encompassing legislators, Governors, Attorneys 
General and those who furnish licenses and perform marriages—
should initiate this. The early implementation efforts appeared 
constructive, but officials across the circuit must redouble their 
work to actually ensure that the promise of comprehensive 
marriage equality becomes a reality.285  
State and local officers may want to collect, inspect, and 
synthesize empirical data on whether same-sex couples have 
experienced problems securing licenses or marriages and whether 
governments have infringed the religious freedom of employees, 
                                                                                                     
 284. See Fisher-Borne v. Smith, 14 F. Supp. 3d 695, 697 (M.D.N.C. 2014), 
objections overruled, 14 F. Supp. 3d 699 (M.D.N.C. 2014); Dale Carpenter, Fourth 
Circuit Strikes Down Virginia Ban on Same-Sex Marriage, WASH. POST (July 28, 
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2014/07/28/fourth-circuit-strikes-down-virginia-ban-on-same-sex-
marriage/?utm_term=.ecd679f2fe34 (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (Judge Henry 
Floyd was an Obama Fourth Circuit appointee, but previously a George W. Bush 
choice for the district court; Judge Roger Gregory was initially a Clinton nominee, 
but was re-nominated and confirmed by George W. Bush) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 285. See supra note 240 and accompanying text. Because Maryland adopted 
marriage equality both earlier than other jurisdictions and by popular vote, its 
track record of positive steps towards implementation may serve as a model for 
other states. 
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who issue licenses or conduct marriages, and private wedding 
services providers. Should evaluation reveal difficulties, they must 
institute solutions which protect marriage equality and religious 
liberty.286 Some in the private sector have litigated this issue,287 as 
seen most recently in the Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado 
Civil Rights Commission288 opinion, which leaves unclear exactly 
how the Supreme Court will ultimately resolve the question.289 In 
the case, the Justices ruled in favor of a baker who refused to make 
a same-sex couple’s wedding cake, but they did so on narrow 
grounds, deciding that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission had 
shown anti-religious bias during its initial consideration of the 
case.290  
The Court did not clearly resolve the issue that the parties 
were seeking to have decided, essentially avoiding the question 
                                                                                                     
 286. The media find little evidence of problems. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, 
Marriage of Necessity: Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty Protections, 64 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161 (2014) (discussing concerns surrounding marriage 
equality implementation and offering solutions, while observing that protecting 
the religious liberties of those who oppose same-sex marriage has proved vital to 
successful implementation). However, the Supreme Court opinion in the 
Masterpiece Cakeshop case very publicly highlighted this issue. For discussion of 
that opinion, see infra notes 287–295 and accompanying text. Connecticut carves 
out an exemption for “religious organization[s],” which may “refuse to ‘provide 
services [or] accommodations . . . to an individual if the request for such is related 
to the solemnization or celebration’ of any marriage—for example, by hosting [a] 
wedding reception—when doing so would violate their religious tenets.” Wilson, 
supra, at 1187. See generally SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Robin 
Fretwell Wilson et al., eds. 2008). 
 287. See State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017), cert. 
granted, judgment vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018) (mem.) (granting judgment in 
favor of a gay couple who sued a Washington florist that refused to provide flowers 
for their wedding; vacated and remanded in light of Masterpiece); see also Lynn 
Thompson, Richland Florist Discriminated Against Gay Couple by Refusing 
Service, State Supreme Court Rules, SEATTLE TIMES, 
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/northwest/richland-florist-
discriminated-against-gay-couple-for-refusing-service-states-highest-court-rules/  
(last updated Feb. 16, 2017, 4:21 PM) (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (describing 
Arlene’s Flowers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
288.  138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
 289. See id. at 1719 (leaving unresolved the question of whether private 
businesses can refuse to provide certain services to LGBT individuals based on a 
religious objection).  
 290. Id. at 1724. 
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whether the baker had engaged in LGBT discrimination.291 The 
Court neither decided nor explicitly discussed the issue of whether 
the First Amendment could or would trump marriage equality that 
Obergefell recognized.292 The majority opinion seemingly intimated 
that a service provider’s sincere religious beliefs might have to 
yield to the state’s interest in protecting same-sex couples’ rights, 
but it left the question’s definitive resolution for another day and 
another case.293 This lack of definitiveness means that future 
litigants will seek to have the Supreme Court resolve the issue.294 
Litigants will now pursue cases that may require lower courts to 
decipher what Masterpiece Cakeshop means for marriage 
equality.295 Lower court judges who confront this question should 
                                                                                                     
 291. Garrett Epps, Justice Kennedy’s Masterpiece Ruling, ATLANTIC (June 4, 
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/the-court-slices-a-
narrow-ruling-out-of-masterpiece-cakeshop/561986/  (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) 
(“[A]fter prolonged labor, on Monday the Court brought forth what can only 
generously be called a mouse.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 292. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1740 (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“The Court does not address this [free-speech] claim because it has some 
uncertainties about the record . . . . Specifically, the parties dispute whether [the 
baker] refused to create a custom wedding cake for the individual respondents, or 
whether he refused to sell them any wedding cake (including a premade one).”) 
(emphases in original). 
 293. See id. at 1723–24 (“Still, the delicate question of when the free exercise 
of his religion must yield to an otherwise valid exercise of state power needed to 
be determined in an adjudication in which religious hostility on the part of the 
State itself would not be a factor in the balance the State sought to reach.”); see 
also Amy Howe, Opinion Analysis: Court Rules (Narrowly) for Baker in 
Same-Sex-Wedding-Cake Case, SCOTUSBLOG.COM (June 4, 2018, 12:04 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/opinion-analysis-court-rules-narrowly-for-
baker-in-same-sex-wedding-cake-case/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (“But the critical 
question of when and how Phillips’ right to exercise his religion can be limited 
had to be determined, Kennedy emphasized, in a proceeding that was not tainted 
by hostility to religion.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 294. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, The Masterpiece Cakeshop Decision Leaves 
Almost All the Big Questions Unanswered, REASON (June 4, 2018, 10:49 AM), 
https://reason.com/volokh/2018/06/04/the-masterpiece-cakeshop-decision-leaves 
(last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (observing that the decision answered none of the 
obviously raised questions in the case including whether bakers have a First 
Amendment right to refuse to bake cakes for same-sex weddings or cakes that 
include text or symbolism that the bakers disapprove) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).   
 295. For example, on June 25, 2018, the Supreme Court vacated the 
Washington Supreme Court’s ruling that a flower shop owner discriminated on 
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apply Obergefell to safeguard the fundamental liberties of 
same-sex couples that the Fourteenth Amendment protects, 
perhaps eschewing a strict constitutional test, and perhaps leave 
Masterpiece Cakeshop to stand for the narrow, fact-specific 
proposition that it articulated.296 Courts should attempt to 
reconcile the conflicting interests of the state in preventing 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and protecting the 
individual liberties embodied in the First Amendment.297 
North Carolina exemplifies religious freedom concerns.298 Its 
2015 law permits registers of deeds and magistrates to seek 
exemptions from issuing licenses and performing marriages based 
                                                                                                     
the basis of sexual orientation by refusing to provide custom floral arrangements 
for same-sex wedding in violation of Washington’s prohibition on discrimination 
in public accommodations and remanded it to the court for reexamination in light 
of Masterpiece Cakeshop. See Arlene’s Flowers Inc. v. Washington, 389 P.3d 543 
(Wash. 2017), vacated by, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018). The Washington Supreme Court 
has yet to decide, but its ruling may provide valuable insight into how courts will 
address the Masterpiece Cakeshop decision. 
 296. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) (“Under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, no State shall ‘deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’”); Lyle Denniston, Opinion 
Analysis: Marriage Now Open to Same-Sex Couples, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 
2015, 3:01 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/opinion-analysis-marriage-
now-open-to-same-sex-couples/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (“Justice Kennedy did 
not spell out what constitutional test he was applying to a claim of gay equality. 
[He] simply discussed . . . precedents, and his own recitation of notions of liberty, 
without saying what burden those challenging the ban had to satisfy before 
winning the right to equality.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 297. See David Bernstein, Trends in First Amendment Jurisprudence: 
Antidiscrimination Laws and the First Amendment, 66 MO. L. REV. 83, 85 (2001) 
(“The Supreme Court finally acknowledged in the 1980s that antidiscrimination 
laws could potentially impinge on First Amendment rights.”).  
 298. See Wilson, supra note 286, at 1237 (discussing that North Carolina is a 
state where opponents to same-sex marriage are “reasonably assured of being 
able to push back same-sex marriage if the question is left to the political 
process”); Erik Eckholm, Conservative Lawmakers and Religious Groups Seek 
Exemptions After Same-Sex Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/conservative-lawmakers-and-faith-
groups-seek-exemptions-after-same-sex-ruling.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) 
(“In North Carolina, where several county magistrates resigned last fall rather 
than abet same-sex marriages, a law has been passed to allow such refusals.”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Campbell, supra note 253 
(allowing state court officials to refuse to perform marriages for same-sex 
couples).  
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on “sincerely held religious objection.”299 The measure seemingly 
accommodates religious liberty and the marriage right, but its 
effectuation needs to protect the rights of all.300  
Legislators and Governors must fully review constitutional, 
statutory, and regulatory commands and change laws that 
preclude same-sex couples’ marriage equality.301 For instance, 
Virginia departments with the Attorney General closely 
scrutinized rules, modifying all that denied equality.302 However, 
GOP lawmakers had insisted on waiting for Obergefell’s resolution 
but have not moved since that time, and other Fourth Circuit 
jurisdictions directly evince analogous inactivity.303 Thus, each 
                                                                                                     
 299. See supra note 251 and accompanying text (describing North Carolina 
legislation as well as state court decisions that have made these exemptions 
possible). Other states which consider adopting similar laws must scrutinize 
North Carolina’s experience to ensure that they safeguard all persons’ rights. 
 300. Equality advocates contested it. See Linda Greenhouse, Drawing the 
Line Between Civil and Religious Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/17/opinion/drawing-the-line-between-civil-
and-religious-rights.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (“The Roberts court has tilted 
quite far in the direction of free exercise . . . . Inevitably, if history is any guide, a 
tipping point will come that causes society to push back and recalibrate the 
balance.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 301. See Carl Tobias, Implementing Marriage Equality in America, 65 DUKE 
L.J. ONLINE 25, 45 (2015) (“In all jurisdictions, state and local 
officials— legislators, Governors, Attorneys General, and personnel who conduct 
weddings and issue marriage licenses—must fully implement Obergefell’s 
mandate so that same-sex couples and their families, particularly these couples' 
children, receive the same treatment as opposite-sex couples and their families.”).  
 302. See supra note 243 and accompanying text (articulating strong 
opposition to denial of equality to same-sex couples).  
 303. See Jenna Portnoy, Same-Sex Marriage is Legal in Virginia, But 




4fa2638cd1b0_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.1989b47c24b8 (last visited 
Dec. 5, 2018) (“With gay marriage in particular, polls show that the overall 
electorate slightly favors it. Yet Republicans are unlikely to budge until the U.S. 
Supreme Court defines marriage once and for all.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); see also Garrett Epps, Marriage Equality Without 
Equivocation, ATLANTIC (Jan. 30, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/01/marriage-equality-without-
equivocation/384999/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (“If the Supreme Court, as seems 
likely, finds that same-sex couples have an equal right to marry, those who stand 
in the courthouse doors will certainly lose, and possibly pay.”) (on file with the 
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ought to meticulously consider legal provisos while altering ones 
that confine equality.304 
All state courts should also be responsive to cases filed by 
people who are in or want to enter or leave same-sex marriages.305 
For example, judges could generally address LGBT persons and 
couples similarly to heterosexual individuals and partners when 
resolving adoption, divorce and custody litigation.306 Maryland and 
                                                                                                     
Washington and Lee Law Review); Jenna Portnoy, Va. GOP Leadership Calls for 




visited Dec. 5, 2018) (“During this year’s General Assembly session several 
lawmakers filed bills that would have removed from the state code references to 
‘husband and wife’ in exchange for the gender-neutral term ‘spouse.’”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). Banning same-sex couple adoptions is 
another example. See VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1201 (2017) (making clear that 
adoption by couples should be made by a husband and wife). 
   304 . Many states have acted slowly. See, e.g., Alan Blinder, In Alabama, One 
County Exits the Marriage Business, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015, 12:16 PM), 
https://www.nytimes.com/live/supreme-court-rulings/in-alabama-one-county-
exits-the-marriage-business/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (“[A]n Alabama probate 
judge said that his office would no longer issue marriage licenses to anyone.”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Erik Eckholm & Manny 
Fernandez, After Same-Sex Marriage Ruling, Southern States Fall in Line, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 29, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/30/us/after-same-sex-
marriage-ruling-southern-states-fall-in-line.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) 
(“Louisiana was the last holdout, the only state where no same-sex licenses were 
issued on Friday after the Supreme Court ruled that gay men and lesbians had a 
constitutional right to marry.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Michael Lavers, Va. Senate Committee Tables Marriage Ban Repeal Bill, 
WASH. BLADE (Jan. 16, 2017, 11:33 PM), 
http://www.washingtonblade.com/2017/01/16/va-senate-committee-tables-sex-
marriage-ban-repeal-bill/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (“A Virginia Senate 
committee . . . tabled a bill that would have repealed state laws banning marriage 
and civil unions for same-sex couples.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Patricia Sullivan, Va. Still Has Laws Banning Gay Marriage, WASH. 
POST (July 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-
politics/virginia-still-has-laws-banning-gay-marriage-should-that-
matter/2016/07/28/44afec36-542a-11e6-b7de-
dfe509430c39_story.html?utm_term=.914852664977 (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) 
(“[R]emoving marriage bans from the books is largely symbolic. But those who are 
trying to reverse the statutes say that the symbolism is deeply powerful.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 305. See infra note 307. 
   306. See infra note 307.  
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Virginia courts have analogously treated LGBT and heterosexual 
people and couples in addressing these kinds of questions.307 
Certain states and many localities have not provided complete 
marriage equality or acted slowly.308 They must ensure total 
equality by consulting efforts in Maryland, Wisconsin and other 
states that did so, as the Justices clearly ruled that equality is the 
law of the land.309 The Fourth Circuit jurisdictions and localities 
which have yet to extend LGBT individuals full protection from 
orientation-based discrimination need to impose bans on that 
misbehavior in employment, housing, education and related 
critical fields, because the laws and marriage equality definitely 
reinforce one another.310 State and local officials could base 
                                                                                                     
  307. See, e.g., Boswell v. Boswell, 721 A.2d 662, 668 (Md. 1998) (treating the 
visitation of children by those in a non-marital relationship the same whether 
they are a same-sex couple or heterosexual); Davenport v. Little-Bowser, 611 
S.E.2d 366, 371 (Va. 2005) (“[T]here is nothing in the statutory scheme that 
precludes recognition of same-sex couples as ‘adoptive parents.’”); see also 
Henderson v. Adams, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1079 (S.D. Ind. 2016) (holding that 
Obergefell extended the same rights to same-sex married couples as opposite-sex 
married couples and those rights required the state to allow both female mothers 
to have their name on their child’s birth certificate); Dara Kam, Fla. Settles 
Federal Birth Certificate Suit, Agrees to Recognize Same-Sex Married Parents, 
MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 11, 2017, 4:05 PM), 
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/gay-south-
florida/article125929324.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (“Two years after gay 
marriage became legal in Florida, the state has agreed to settle a federal lawsuit 
over birth certificates issued to children born into same-sex marriages.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 308. Most are outside the Fourth Circuit. See sources cited supra note 304, 
infra note 316 (highlighting instances in Texas, Alabama, and Louisiana). 
 309. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 25 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(reaffirming “the decision that color alone cannot bar a child from a public 
school”); Kluger, supra note 273, at 754–55 (discussing the impact Warren Court 
decisions had on both racial and overall equality following the Brown decision). 
But see supra notes 262–268 and accompanying text (describing federal and state 
initiatives that could restrict LGBT individuals’ rights). 
 310. See Past LGBT Nondiscrimination and Anti-LGBT Bills Across the 
Country, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/map/non-discrimination-laws-state-state-
information-map (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (providing a comprehensive list of 
state legislation affecting LGBT rights) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Map of Employment and Public Accommodations States, LAMBDALEGAL, 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/states-regions (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (displaying 
the legal protections available for LGBT people in each state concerning; 
workplace protection, public accommodations, and marriage and relationship 
protections) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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measures on practices of jurisdictions and subdivisions which 
proscribe this conduct or the Federal Equality Act that was 
introduced during 2015.311 Those government-level endeavors are 
crucial, as the 114th Congress nominally analyzed this bill, which 
members reintroduced over 2017.312  
If state or local officers do not prescribe equality or act slowly, 
litigants filing prior cases might reopen them and even urge 
federal judges to hold officials in contempt.313 Most notorious was 
a Kentucky clerk whom a jurist found in contempt and sentenced 
to jail because she would not comply with his order to afford 
couples licenses.314 If these parties eschew suit, others harmed by 
the failure to institute equality may consider litigation vindicating 
their rights.315  
                                                                                                     
 311. See S.1858, 114th Cong. (2015) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation); State Maps of Laws & Policies, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, 
https://www.hrc.org/state-maps (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (showing a state by 
state breakdown of laws and policies that affect the LGBT community) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); William Turner, The Gay Rights 
State: Wisconsin’s Pioneering Legislation to Prohibit Discrimination Based on 
Sexual Orientation, 22 WIS. WOMEN’S L. J. 91, 131 (2007) (“The nation’s first 
legislation prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation . . . was a 
major milestone in the history of lesbian and gay civil rights and deserves to be 
remembered as such.”); N.Y. Women’s Equality Act, A08070 (2017) (providing 
better protection of women’s rights; including pay equality, and many other forms 
of discrimination).   
 312. See S.1006, 115th Cong. (2017) (reintroducing the bill prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation). 
 313. See infra note 314 (providing an example of an official being held in 
contempt).  
 314. See Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924, 944 (E.D. Ky. 2015) (granting a 
preliminary injunction to keep the Rowan County Clerk from applying her “no 
marriage licenses” policy to same-sex couple marriage requests); Alan Blinder & 
Tamar Lewin, Clerk in Kentucky Chooses Jail Over Deal on Same-Sex Marriage, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/us/kim-davis-
same-sex-marriage.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (“The clerk, Kim Davis of 
Rowan County, Ky., was ordered detained for contempt of court and later rejected 
a proposal to allow her deputies to process same-sex marriage licenses that could 
have prompted her release.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
Blinder, supra note 304 (discussing a local probate judge’s resistance to issuing 
same-sex marriage licenses). Similar, but less notorious, is Strawser v. Strange, 
190 F. Supp. 3d 1078, 1084 (S.D. Ala. 2016) (issuing a final judgment enjoining 
judges and other public officials in Alabama “from enforcing the Alabama laws 
that prohibit or fail to recognize same-sex marriage”).   
 315. Pending Marriage Equality Cases, LAMBDALEGAL, 
MARRIAGE EQUALITY 2061 
B. United States 
Most jurisdictions and localities throughout the nation have 
appeared to implement full marriage equality, but others have not 
or moved slowly, phenomena evidenced in recent events.316 The 
latter need to promptly ensure maximum equality by instituting 
actions like those found in states and localities that have 
expeditiously implemented total equality.317 Fruitful insights can 
now be derived from Maryland and Virginia executive branch 
initiatives.318 For example, the Maryland Attorney General issued 
a comprehensive opinion which afforded guidance regarding 
equality’s institution, while his Virginia counterpart and state 
                                                                                                     
https://www.lambdalegal.org/pending-marriage-equality-cases (last visited Dec. 
5, 2018) (providing data on pending marriage equality lawsuits across America) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 316. Texas’s Supreme Court voided a local grant of spousal benefits to 
same-sex couples. See Pidgeon v. Turner, 538 S.W.3d 73 (Tex. 2017), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 505 (2017) (holding that on remand the trial court did not need 
to follow the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision that found laws in Texas 
forbidding same-sex marriage unconstitutional); Mark Stern, Texas May Hire 
Random Contractors to Issue Same-Sex Marriage Licenses Over the Phone, SLATE 
(Apr. 17, 2017, 3:46 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2017/04/17/texas_ 
may_hire_contractors_to_perform_same_sex_marriages_over_the_phone.html 
(last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (“[T]he Texas Senate approved a bill that would allow 
religious clerks to opt out of issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples.”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Mike Ward, Texas Senate OKs 
Bill Setting New Rules When Clerks Refuse to Issue Same-Sex Marriage Licenses, 
HOUS. CHRON. (Apr. 11, 2017), 
https://www.chron.com/news/politics/texas/article/Senate-approves-same-sex-
marriage-license-change-11066029.php (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (“Legislation 
that would allow county clerks in Texas to decline to issue same-sex marriage 
licenses if it conflicts with their religious beliefs was tentatively approved 
Tuesday by the Texas Senate.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); supra note 257 (discussing West Virginia’s concession to stop opposing 
same-sex couples who wished to be married). 
 317. See Haeyoun Park, Gay Marriage State by State: From a Few States to 
the Whole Nation, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/04/us/gay-marriage-state-by-state. 
html (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (displaying a timeline for when states passed 
legislation, or by court order, legalized same-sex marriage) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 318. See supra notes 240–260 and accompanying text (showing the process 
that Maryland, Virginia, and the state department took to achieve equality). 
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departments canvassed regulations and changed all that denied 
marriage equality.319 
The Obama White House provided same-sex couples federal 
benefits in jurisdictions with bans expeditiously after their 
rejection.320 President Donald Trump insisted that marriage 
equality was “settled” following his November victory, while a draft 
executive order provision that would have implemented 
exemptions for those with religious objections to same-sex 
marriage was omitted in the final version.321 However, certain 
Justice Department positions on LGBT equality leave Trump’s 
views unclear.322 Because state and local officers could be reluctant 
                                                                                                     
 319. See id. 
 320. See Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Lynch Announces Federal 
Marriage Benefits Available to Same-Sex Couples Nationwide (July 9, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-lynch-announces-federal-
marriage-benefits-available-same-sex-couples (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) 
(“Attorney General Lynch announced today that federal marriage benefits will be 
available to same-sex couples nationwide following the Supreme Court ruling 
in Obergefell v. Hodges.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 321. See Exec. Order No. 13,798, 82 Fed. Reg. 21,675 (May 4, 2017) (omitting 
any mention of same-sex marriage rights); Jennifer Bendery & Elise Foley, 
Trump Signs Religious Liberty Executive Order That Appears to Leave LGBTQ 
People Alone, HUFFINGTON POST (May 5, 2017, 10:37 PM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-order-religious-
freedom_us_590a812ee4b05c39768620b1 (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (“It looks 
like LGBTQ rights advocates can breathe a sigh of relief after President Donald 
Trump on Thursday signed a religious liberty executive order that doesn’t directly 
target LGBTQ people . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
Eli Stokols, Trump Says He’s ‘Fine’ With Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage, 
POLITICO (Nov. 13, 2016, 7:00 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/11/donald-trump-same-sex-marriage-
231310 (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (“Donald Trump said he is ‘fine with’ same-sex 
marriage . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 322. Horwitz & Hsu, supra note 266 (“In a memo to his U.S. attorney offices 
and agency heads, Sessions said that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does 
not protect transgender people from workplace discrimination by private 
employers and state and local governments.”); Jeremy Peters et. al., Trump 
Rescinds Rules on Bathrooms for Transgender Students, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/22/us/politics/devos-sessions-
transgender-students-rights.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (“President Trump on 
Wednesday rescinded protections for transgender students that had allowed them 
to use bathrooms corresponding with their gender identity . . . .”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Charlie Savage, 5 Transgender Service 
Members Sue Trump Over Military Ban, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/09/us/politics/5-transgender-service-members-
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to adopt provisos which do ensure full equality, Congress should 
carefully review proposals, including the Equality Act, that would 
amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include sex, sexual 
orientation, and gender identity among the prohibited categories 
of discrimination.323 Both houses must survey all fifty jurisdictions’ 
protections and convene hearings respecting the issue, although 
the last two Congresses failed to seriously evaluate legislation, 
despite the ample need for a law’s enactment.324 Without Congress’ 
leadership, plentiful states and localities may not prescribe total 
equality. 
IV. Conclusion 
Fourth Circuit jurisdictions helped institute marriage 
equality as the law of the land.325 Judge Wright Allen’s thorough 
opinion invalidating bans; Fourth Circuit affirmance; North 
Carolina, South Carolina and West Virginia district cases rejecting 
proscriptions; and Obergefell brought equality to the Fourth 
Circuit.326 These initiatives enabled same-sex couples and their 
families, particularly children, to secure valuable advantages, 
which the jurisdictions had only bestowed on heterosexual 
couples.327 Accordingly, states in the Fourth Circuit and 
                                                                                                     
sue-trump-over-military-ban.html?login=email&auth=login-email (last visited 
Dec. 5, 2018) (“The lawsuit was filed in response to Mr. Trump’s ban abruptly 
announced last month on Twitter.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 323. See H.R. 2282, 115th Cong. (2017) (introducing a bill in the House to 
amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964); S. 1006, 115th Cong. (2017) (introducing the 
same bill in the Senate). Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina 
Representatives and Senators from Virginia and Maryland were cosponsors.  
 324. See supra note 311 (failing to seriously evaluate the bill because it never 
came to the House or Senate floor); German Lopez, The Equality Act, the Most 
Comprehensive LGBTQ Rights Bill Ever, Explained, VOX (Nov. 10, 2015, 6:00 
PM), https://www.vox.com/2015/7/23/9023611/equality-act-lgbt-rights (last 
visited Dec. 5, 2018) (discussing the critical need for the bill) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 325. See supra note 37 (finding Virginia laws that barred same-sex marriages 
or the recognition of them from other jurisdictions unconstitutional).  
 326. See id. (invalidating Virginia bans on same-sex marriage); supra note 9 
(listing cases that promoted these equalities). 
 327. See e.g., supra note 307 (discussing examples such as adoptive rights and 
birth certificates that reflect both same-sex parent names).  
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throughout the United States which lack complete marriage 
equality need to promptly implement full equality. 
